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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2020, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (4): 207-219.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0295

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

公众参与下政府与游戏企业发展策略的演化博弈分析

曲国华1, 刘雪1, 曲卫华2,3, 张强4   

  1. 1. 山西财经大学管理科学与工程学院, 山西 太原 030006;
    2. 山西大学管理与决策研究所, 山西 太原 030006;
    3. 山西大学经济与管理学院, 山西 太原 030006;
    4. 北京理工大学管理与经济学院, 北京 100081
  • 收稿日期:2019-03-06 修回日期:2019-07-30 出版日期:2020-04-20 发布日期:2020-04-30
  • 通讯作者: 曲卫华(1982-),男(汉族),山西忻州人,山西大学,副教授,博士,研究方向:能源环境经济与金融工程,E-mail:quweihua@sxu.edu.cn. E-mail:quweihua@sxu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金资助项目（16BGL041）

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Development Strategies of Government and Game Enterprises under Public Participation

QU Guo-hua1, LIU Xue1, QU Wei-hua2,3, ZHANG Qiang4   

  1. 1. School of Management Science and Engineering, Shanxi University of Finance and Economics, Taiyuan 030006, China;
    2. Institute of Management and Decision, Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China;
    3. School of Economics and Management, Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China;
    4. School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China
  • Received:2019-03-06 Revised:2019-07-30 Online:2020-04-20 Published:2020-04-30

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摘要： 游戏企业选择设置防沉迷机制行为策略是应对青少年沉迷网络游戏等不良社会影响的有效举措，公众的监督和政府部门的监管是构建良好社会风气的重要保障。本文针对我国越来越多青少年沉迷虚拟网络游戏而影响社会风气的问题，考虑政府监管与公众的监督，构建政府、公众、游戏企业的三方演化博弈模型，并建立复制动态方程，得到不同情形下政府、公众和游戏企业的演化稳定策略；并通过数值分析的方法，分析监管成功率对政府与游戏企业防沉迷机制选择的影响。研究表明，监管成功率对游戏企业策略选择起着重要影响。不同情形下，政府可以根据所掌握的相关信息对游戏企业采取不同策略进行有效监管。从短期角度来看，无论政府采取何种策略，公众与游戏企业会考虑自身利益而选择"不监督"和"不设置防沉迷机制"；从长期角度来看，在没有政府监管情况下，公众与游戏企业依然会主动选择"监督"和"设置防沉迷机制"。

关键词: 游戏企业, 防沉迷机制, 政府监管, 公众监督, 演化博弈

Abstract: It is an effective measure to deal with teenagers' addiction to online games and other negative social influences for game enterprises to choose and set up anti-addiction mechanism behavior strategy. Public supervision and government regulation are important guarantees to build a good social atmosphere.Aiming at the problem that more and more teenagers in our country indulge in virtual online games and influence social atmosphere, a three-party evolutionary game model of government, the public,game enterprises is constructed and a replicated dynamic equation is established on the basis of government regulation and public supervision.According to the results of this model, the evolutionary stability strategy under different circumstances of the government,the public and the game enterprises is gotten. Through the method of numerical analysis, the influence of the success rate ofregulation between the government and game enterprises' choice of anti-addiction mechanism is analyzed through the method of numerical analysis.The research shows that the success rate of regulation plays an important role in the strategy selection of game enterprises. Under different circumstances, the government can effectively supervise the game enterprises to adopt different strategies according to the relevant information. From a short-term perspective, no matter what strategy the government adopts, the public and game companies will choose "no supervision" and "no anti-addiction mechanism" in consideration of their own interests. In the long run, in the absence of government supervision, the public and game companies will still take the initiative to choose "supervision" and "set up anti-addiction mechanism".

Key words: game enterprises, anti-addiction mechanism, government regulation, public supervision, evolutionary game

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