关键词: 电商平台, 物流一体化, 自建, 并购, 演化博弈

Abstract: Facing the fierce logistics aging market competition,many e-commerce platforms have begun to establish their own logistics systems through self-construction or merger and acquisition(M&A). In view of this, self-construction and M&A are considered as alternatives to two e-commerce platform oligarchs with the intention of building a self-operated logistics system. Firstly, the reverse induction method is used to solve the equilibrium profits of the two platforms when they both adopt self-construction mode, both adopt M&A mode, and one adopts self-construction mode while the other adopts M&A mode respectively. Then, based on the evolutionary game theory, the stability of different equilibrium points are analyzed. Finally, four different evolutional stable equilibriums are obtained. The research conclusions are as follows:(1)If self-construction's investment is obviously lower than that of M&A, and the buyer's demand is not sensitive to the competitive platform's logistics services, both platforms will take self-construction as the dominant strategy, so the pooling equilibrium (self-construction, self-construction) can be formed. (2)If M&A's input is obviously lower than that of self-construction,and the buyer's demand is not sensitive to the competitive platform's logistics service, both platforms will take M&A as the dominant strategy, so the pooling equilibrium (M&A, M&A) can be formed. (3)If the two logistics integration modes have a different fixed input in the early stage, and the operating cost in operational phase is not sensitive to logistics service, when the buyer's demand is sensitive to the logistics service of the other platform, neither platforms have dominant strategy, but they will choose the same logistics integration mode to the competitor's as their optimal stratgey, so two pooling equilibriums which are (self-construction, self-construction) and (M&A, M&A) can be formed. (4)If the difference on fixed input between the two logistics integration modes is small, and the operating cost is not sensitive to logistics service level, when the buyer's demand is not sensitive to the other platform's logistics service, neither platforms have dominant strategy, but they will choose a different logistics integration mode to the competitor's as their optimal stratgey, so two separating equilibriums which are (self-construction, M&A) and (M&A, self-construction) can be formed.

Key words: e-commerce platform, logistics integration, self-construction, merger and acquisition(M&A), evolutionary game