主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

中国管理科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (3): 59-70.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0203

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

多主体参与的绿色技术创新系统均衡及稳定性

汪明月1, 李颖明1,2   

  1. 1. 中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院, 北京 100190;
    2. 中国科学院大学公共政策与管理学院, 北京 100049
  • 收稿日期:2019-02-12 修回日期:2019-07-30 发布日期:2021-04-02
  • 通讯作者: 李颖明(1978-),女(汉族),河北衡水人,中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院,研究员,博士,研究方向:绿色转型发展,E-mail:liyingming@casipm.ac.cn. E-mail:liyingming@casipm.ac.cn
  • 作者简介:李颖明(1978-),女(汉族),河北衡水人,中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院,研究员,博士,研究方向:绿色转型发展,E-mail:liyingming@casipm.ac.cn.
  • 基金资助:
    中国博士后科学基金第67批面上资助项目(2020M67442);科技部发展改革专项项目(2018.3-2019.12);国家社会科学基金重大项目(19VMG040)

Equilibrium and Stability of Green Technology Innovation System with Multi-agent Participation

WANG Ming-yue1, LI Ying-ming1,2   

  1. 1. Institutes of Science and Development, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;
    2. School of Public Policy and Management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China
  • Received:2019-02-12 Revised:2019-07-30 Published:2021-04-02

摘要: 构建由政府、企业和消费者组成的绿色技术创新系统演化博弈模型,分析了不同情形下参与主体策略选择对系统均衡策略影响的演化过程,并借助系统动力学实验方法进行了实验模拟论证。研究发现:(1)在绿色技术创新演化博弈系统所有可能的均衡策略中,只存在三个稳定的均衡策略,其中,绿色产品消费的经济收益和绿色技术创新品牌收益是驱动博弈系统向不同稳定均衡策略演进的重要动力。(2)企业绿色技术创新品牌收益和消费者绿色产品消费的经济收益是影响博弈演化系统最终向不同稳定均衡策略演进的主要因素。(3)在均衡状态(1,1,1)和均衡状态(1,0,0)下,通过促进消费者采取购买绿色产品策略对绿色技术创新系统的影响更为显著;在均衡状态(1,1,0)下,促进消费者采取购买绿色产品策略对绿色技术创新系统的影响更为显著,而提高市场规制强度和企业绿色技术创新意愿的影响效果较为微弱。

关键词: 市场规制, 企业绿色技术创新, 绿色产品需求, 演化博弈理论

Abstract: By constructing the evolutionary game model of green technology innovation system composed of governments, enterprises and consumers, the evolutionary process of the influence of the participants' strategy choice on the equilibrium strategy of the system in different situations is analyzed, and an experimental demonstration is made by means of system dynamics experiment. It is found that,(1) Of all the possible equilibrium strategies in the evolutionary game system of green technological innovation, there are only three stable equilibrium strategies, namely, the strategies of local government, enterprises and consumers are (market regulation, non-green technological innovation, purchase traditional products), (market regulation, green technological innovation, purchase traditional products), (non-market regulation, green technological innovation purchase green products). (2) Brand benefits of enterprise green technology innovation and economic income of green product consumption of consumer are the main factors that influence the evolution of game evolution system to different stable equilibrium strategies. (3) Under the equilibrium state (1,1,1) and equilibrium state (1,0,0), the impact of green technology innovation system is more significant by promoting enterprises to adopt green technology innovation strategy and consumers to adopt green product consumer strategy. Under the equilibrium state (1,1,0), promoting consumers to adopt the strategy of purchasing green products has a more significant impact on the green technology innovation system, while improving the market regulation intensity and enterprises' green technology innovation willingness has a not significant impact. It provides a reference for further perfecting the green development theory, and also for constructing the market-oriented green technology innovation system.

Key words: market regulation, enterprise green technology innovation, green product demand, game theory

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