Table of Content

    20 March 2021, Volume 29 Issue 3 Previous Issue    Next Issue
    Systemic Risk Shock, Enterprise Innovation Ability and Stock Price Volatility: Theoretical and Empirical Research
    CHEN Qi-an, ZHANG Hui
    2021, 29 (3):  1-13.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0074
    Abstract ( 484 )   PDF (992KB) ( 183 )   Save
    Systemic risk is an important factor driving stock market price fluctuation. Different stocks often have different falling and rising amplitude during and after the systemic risk shock. As a comprehensive index reflecting the market competitiveness and profitability of listed companies, enterprise innovation ability is bound to have an important impact on the intrinsic value of their stocks and trading behavior of investors, which may cause different stock price to present different volatility under the same systemic risk shock. Therefore, exploring the impact mechanism and empirical evidence of systemic risk shock and enterprise innovation ability on stock price volatility not only helps to clarify the reasons why different stocks present different price stability under the same systemic risk shock, but also may provide theoretical guidance for promoting listed companies to consciously improve their innovation ability and assisting our country to implement innovation-driven strategy through the stock market. Firstly, a mathematical model is established to theoretically research the influence mechanism of systemic risk shock and enterprise innovation ability on stock price volatility. And then taking the related data of China's A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2017 as sample, taking the continuous decline by more than 18% of China's CSI 300 index as the source of systemic risk shock, constructing the innovation ability index from three dimensions of innovation input, innovation output and innovation environment, the hierarchical regression analysis is used to empirically test the results of the theoretical model. The main research conclusions are as follows. Theoretically, the stock price volatility decreases with the increase of enterprise innovation ability, and increases with the enhancement of systemic risk shock. Enterprise innovation ability can weaken the impact of systemic risk shock on stock price volatility, thus enhancing the stock market stability. The empirical results based on the full sample show that the coefficients of systemic risk shock are significantly positive at 1% level, and the coefficients of enterprise innovation ability and the cross term of systemic risk shock and enterprise innovation ability are significantly negative at 1% level, which support the conclusions of the theoretical model. The empirical results based on the samples of SOEs and non-SOEs are similar to those based on the full sample. Systemic risk shock and enterprise innovation ability will have similar effects on the stock price volatility in SOEs and non-SOEs, and the only difference is that the effect of enterprise innovation ability on stock price volatility of non-SOEs is slightly less significant than that of SOEs, which also support the conclusions of theoretical model. The empirical results based on the samples of manufacturing and non-manufacturing enterprises show that the systemic risk shock will significantly increase the stock price volatility of manufacturing and non-manufacturing enterprises, but the influence of enterprise innovation ability on the two enterprises' stock price volatility has different significance levels. The basic characteristics of non-manufacturing enterprises' innovation ability and their internal relationship with firm performance and investor behavior make their innovation ability have no significant impact on stock price volatility.Base on the above-mentioned results, the following policy suggestions can be proposed. China's securities regulatory authorities should regulate market supervision behavior to reduce the frequency and impact of systemic risks, reform the listing system and delisting system to strengthen the "survival of the fittest" mechanism, optimize the innovation incentive mechanism to continuously improve the innovation ability of listed companies, and improve the information disclosure system to enhance investors' cognitive levels of systemic risk shock and enterprise innovation ability.
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    House Price Changes, Industry Transfer and Regional Coordinated Development
    TANG Song-lin, ZHOU Wen-bing, WANG Guo-cheng
    2021, 29 (3):  14-23.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1572
    Abstract ( 378 )   PDF (1052KB) ( 149 )   Save
    The coordinated development of the beijing-tianjin-hebei region is an important national development strategy in China. In recent years, the rapid growth of housing price has attracted wide attention from the society and made the impact of housing price on the economy an important topic of concern.On the basis of Footloose Capital Model, a "Housing Price-Capital" model is constructed in this paper, to analyze the impact of investment income of the real estate industry on industrial reinvestment. Through the numerical simulation of the model, the following conclusions can be drawn:(1) the appropriate inter-regional difference in investment income of the real estate industry is conducive to the transfer of industrial enterprises from core area to surrounding area, while the huge difference will result in the flow of capital to the real estate industry in the core area. (2) If the inter-regional differences in investment returns of real estate industry are constant, the large economic development gap will hinder the industrial transfer, while the fierce market competition will promote it. Following that, based on the annual data of 13 cities in the beijing-tianjin-hebei region from 2005 to 2017, a panel threshold model is built to analyzes the impact mechanism of housing price, per capita GDP and industrial scale on real estate development investment and the fixed asset investment in the primary industry, secondary industry and tertiary industry (excluding real estate) respectively. The following conclusions can be drawn from panel threshold model:(1) the rising housing price has "crowding out effect" and "wealth effect" on the fixed asset investment in all industries. Therein, the "crowding out effect" is the most significant in the primary industry, and the "wealth effect" is the most significant in the tertiary industry (excluding real estate). (2) Under government control, reasonable housing price growth is conducive to guiding the transfer of capital from the real estate industry to other industries. (3) The dependence of fixed asset investment in the tertiary industry (excluding real estate) and the real estate industry on the industrial scale is smaller than that in the primary industry and the secondary industry, but more inclined to the economically developed regions.
    Based on above research, the following suggestions are put forward:(1) the core area becoming a metropolis is the final result of regional integration and the best choice to improve the overall utilization efficiency of regional resources. Economic aggregate, technology, political and other advantages will inevitably accelerate the growth of investment in core areas. On the one hand, the government should strictly implement the principle of "housing residence instead of vicious speculation" and encourage capital flow from the real estate industry to the real economy, thus promoting the upgrading of industrial structure. On the other hand, industrial policies restrict investment in inefficient industries and force low-value-added industries to move out of the region, so as to enhance the economic radiation capacity of large cities and promote the coordinated development of regional economy.(2) the economic hinterland is the foundation on which big cities rely for their existence. The housing price policy and industrial incentive policy should be comprehensively utilized to build a stepped economic hinterland:(a) With the development of economy, the rise of house price is inevitable. For the less developed areas, reasonable housing price growth can screen out and undertake the transfer of the core area of relatively efficient industries. At the same time, the policy of "stabilizing the housing price" is also conducive to the transfer of relatively inefficient capital from the sub-developed areas to the marginal areas, so as to avoid the real estate industry in the sub-developed areas "squeezing" the high-quality capital from the marginal areas. (b) Low transaction cost can accelerate the flow of capital, but the most marginal areas are at an absolute disadvantage in the game of regional development. Therefore, appropriate local industrial protection policies are necessary for the most marginal areas. Investment-oriented incentives should be used as far as possible to reduce the barriers of protection policies to regional integration. Marginal areas should pay more attention to maintaining the stability of housing prices and avoid harming the sustainable development of primary and secondary industries.
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    Portfolio Selection with Conditional Skewness Estimated via MIDAS Quantile Regressions
    XU Qi-fa, LIU Shu-ting, JIANG Cui-xia
    2021, 29 (3):  24-36.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0377
    Abstract ( 345 )   PDF (1304KB) ( 121 )   Save
    Conditional skewness is one of the stylized facts in financial market. Its most widely used measure is the standardized third moment, but this moment based measure is very sensitive to outliers. In addition, as many previous works have shown, conditional skewness plays an important role in portfolio selection. The conventional portfolio approaches, which ignore the effect of conditional skewness, are often difficult to fully capture the "true risk" and cannot disperse financial risk efficiently. Thus, it is necessary to incorporate conditional skewness into the portfolio selection problem. In the presence of skewness, it is often introduced into the objective function of a portfolio selection model. This makes the portfolio optimization a challenging task, which needs to trade off the conflicting and competing objects simultaneously. To address the above issues, the combination of mixed data sampling (MIDAS) and quantile regression (QR), namely MIDAS-QR model, are first applied to improve the performance of conditional skewness measure. Then, the portfolio weights are designed as a linear function of conditional skewness and asset characteristics, and portfolio selection models are developed with the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility. Furthermore, a two-step solution scheme is designed for its solution. Our approach has at least three advantages. First, the MIDAS-QR model makes full use of rich information contained in high-frequency data to estimate time-varying conditional skewness accurately and robustly. Second, the portfolio models we constructed not only take into account the investor attitude towards skewness, but also can be easily optimized as it reduces the numbers of parameters to be estimated. Third, the two-step solution scheme allows us to identify the specific role of conditional skewness in portfolio selection, including the significance, direction and magnitude of its impact. To illustrate the efficacy of our method, an empirical application on 10 typical stocks from the China Securities Index (CSI) 300 Index is conducted. The data is collected from the Genium Finance platform (http://www.genius.com.cn) and covers the period from Jan 1, 2006 to May 31, 2017. The rolling estimates of moment-based skewness and hybrid skewness are compared. Then, the proposed models are compared with the classical equal-weighted scheme and the mean-variance model in terms of expected return, standard deviation, downside risk, Sharpe Ratio, and Sortino Ratio. The empirical results are promising and show that compared with moment-based skewness, the rolling estimation distribution of hybrid skewness is more concentrated and less sensitive to outliers. This shows that hybrid skewness measure is an effective and robust method. Moreover, our proposed portfolio models with conditional skewness perform better than those competing models in terms of dispersing investment risk and improving portfolio performance. In practice, kurtosis is also concerned by investors. A rational investor will prefer to minimize kurtosis, which can be seen as a way to reduce the possibility of extreme events. To this end, it would be necessary to measure conditional kurtosis and incorporate it into the construction of optimal portfolio selection. This is an interesting topic and we leave it for future research.
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    Study on Interregional Coordination Method of Initial Allocation on Air Pollutant Emission Permits
    WANG Shu-qiang, LIU He, XU Na, MENG Di
    2021, 29 (3):  37-48.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.0522
    Abstract ( 304 )   PDF (2798KB) ( 74 )   Save
    It is key to implement the policy of interregional joint prevention and control of air pollution into practice that the overall responsibility for emission reduction is scientifically divided to each member region, and the emission limits for each member region is confirmed reasonably to realize voluntary emission reduction. Based on non-cooperative game theory, the optimal allocation model of the emission rights which satisfy the income constraint and ecological constraint is construted. Then the corresponding Nash equilibrium solution showing the emission limits for each member region is solved for three typical economic relations between regions and the empirical tests are conducted.The conclusion shows that on initial stage of industrialization, the emission limits of the member region is their own non-regulated emissions,without regard to inter-regional transmission. The changing trend of SO2 actual emissions in Gansu and Xinjiang coincides with that. On the stage of the early and middle of industrialization, the emission limits of the central region industrialized firstly is depended on the extreme point satisfying ecological constraint,but can not reach the extreme point satisfying income constraint, the emission limits of the peripheral region is its non-regulated emissions reaching the extreme point satisfying income and ecological constraint which the changing trend of SO2 actual emissions in Sichuan and Chongqing coincides with. On the stage of the late and middle industrialization,the decision on the emission among regions is interacted obviously, the emission limits of all regions is depended on the extreme point satisfying ecological constraint,but can not reach the extreme point satisfying income constraint, and the changing trend of SO2 actual emissions in Hebei and Beijing coincides with that. Further analysis finds that the capacity effect is the pollution source of Hebei and the transmission effect is the pollution source of Beijing,and it is urgent to strengthen the joint prevention and control of air pollution between two places.
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    Study on the Contagion Mechanism of Associated Credit Risk with Double Propagation Path
    XU Kai, ZHOU Zong-fang, QIAN Qian
    2021, 29 (3):  49-58.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1320
    Abstract ( 269 )   PDF (2835KB) ( 96 )   Save
    The associated credit risk and relevant contagion is a hot and difficult problem in modern credit risk management field. Based on the average field theory of complex network, the epidemic model is applied to describe the contagion mechanism of associated credit risk on associated credit individuals in this paper. The stable state of associated credit risk contagion in the associated individual network has been analyzed with infectivity in hidden period and infective period of double propagation path. Furthermore, the influence of associated credit risk contagion factors on the stability in the general associated individual network environment has been discussed. The results show that the associated credit risk contagion threshold is related with network structure, and this threshold is contrary to hidden period and infective period, and keeps same change in the mutual conversion rate between hidden individuals and infected individuals, also keeps same change with the respective infection rates of hidden period and infective period. The density of hidden individuals keeps same change with the hidden period and the infection rate, which is contrary to the infective period. The density of infected individuals keeps same change with the infective period and the infection rate, which is contrary to the hidden period.This study enriches the research scope of credit risk and provides a new perspective for enterprises, banks and other credit individuals to control credit risk.
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    Equilibrium and Stability of Green Technology Innovation System with Multi-agent Participation
    WANG Ming-yue, LI Ying-ming
    2021, 29 (3):  59-70.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0203
    Abstract ( 385 )   PDF (2595KB) ( 128 )   Save
    By constructing the evolutionary game model of green technology innovation system composed of governments, enterprises and consumers, the evolutionary process of the influence of the participants' strategy choice on the equilibrium strategy of the system in different situations is analyzed, and an experimental demonstration is made by means of system dynamics experiment. It is found that,(1) Of all the possible equilibrium strategies in the evolutionary game system of green technological innovation, there are only three stable equilibrium strategies, namely, the strategies of local government, enterprises and consumers are (market regulation, non-green technological innovation, purchase traditional products), (market regulation, green technological innovation, purchase traditional products), (non-market regulation, green technological innovation purchase green products). (2) Brand benefits of enterprise green technology innovation and economic income of green product consumption of consumer are the main factors that influence the evolution of game evolution system to different stable equilibrium strategies. (3) Under the equilibrium state (1,1,1) and equilibrium state (1,0,0), the impact of green technology innovation system is more significant by promoting enterprises to adopt green technology innovation strategy and consumers to adopt green product consumer strategy. Under the equilibrium state (1,1,0), promoting consumers to adopt the strategy of purchasing green products has a more significant impact on the green technology innovation system, while improving the market regulation intensity and enterprises' green technology innovation willingness has a not significant impact. It provides a reference for further perfecting the green development theory, and also for constructing the market-oriented green technology innovation system.
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    Research to the Influential Factors of Transformation and Upgrading of Industry Chain Downstream Firms——Based on the Perspective of Different Final Products Market
    WANG Xing-tang
    2021, 29 (3):  71-79.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.0815
    Abstract ( 245 )   PDF (967KB) ( 106 )   Save
    With the intensification of international competition and China's industrial economic downturn, the stress on existence of China's manufacturing enterprises is increasing. Whether China's manufacturing enterprises can change the mode of development and achieve transformation and upgrading is need studying deeply. By establishing a theoretical model under the vertical linked market structure, the fundamental restraints on the transformation and upgrading of manufacturing enterprises downstream of the industrial chain is analyzed, and an in-depth discussion is made on the rational formulation of the R&D policies. This research shows that the fundamental factor restricting the downstream enterprises of the industrial chain to carry out transformation and upgrading is their core technology level. When the core technology level of an enterprise is relatively high, even if the production cost of intermediate products is higher than the cost of imported intermediate products, due to the existence of independent research and development, enterprises will still choose to produce their own core intermediate products for transformation and upgrading. In terms of enterprises' R&D, enterprises with poor final product quality and lower core technology level are less motivated to conduct R&D. In terms of R&D subsidy formulation, it is further found that the location of the final product market would affect the robustness of R&D subsidy policy. When the final product market is located in a third country, the government should not intervene in the R&D of enterprises, and when the final product market is located in home, the government should subsidize the R&D activities of enterprises, and the R&D subsidy policy will promote the transformation and upgrading of firms.
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    Product Quality Supervision Model of Random Inspections
    KONG Qing-shan, ZHANG Qin, YANG Hui-xin, WEN De-cheng
    2021, 29 (3):  80-89.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1128
    Abstract ( 537 )   PDF (1732KB) ( 92 )   Save
    ‘Double Random, One Disclosure’ is an innovative supervision model which proposed by the government of China and pursued in the field of market supervision. An oversight model drawing on random inspections by randomly selected law enforcement officers or inspectors and requiring the prompt release of results.For the first time, the evaluation game theory is used to construct the theoretical analysis framework of ‘Double Random, One Disclosure’ product quality supervision, the relationship between ‘Random Inspections’ and ‘Release Information’ is clarified as well as participants, the group behavior evolution of enterprise in market entity list and inspectors in law enforcers list is analyzed, the incentive mechanism is raised for the supervision model. It is found that it's not enough to quash the quality false behavior and inefficient inspection behavior by ‘Double Random, One Disclosure’. Enforcing inspection incentives for inspectors or quality incentives for enterprise separately play a role in system benign evolution when the public reputation is high enough, otherwise the system needs to enforce inspection incentives and quality incentives at the same time. Designing inspection incentives need enforcing inspection incentives for inspectors of standard quality and quality fraud, designing quality incentive need enforce quality incentives for efficient and inefficient inspections. There are great differences in the evolution track of system stable points between inspection incentives and quality incentives. The inspection incentive makes inspectors evolve to efficient inspection, then drives enterprise evolve to standard quality by reputation effect, while quality incentive make enterprise evolve to standard quality, then drives inspectors evolve to efficient inspection by reputation effect, however, the system cannot evolve to ideal state because the transmission system be cut off with lower public reputation. Finally, some suggestions are made for the government to complete and innovate'Double Random, One Disclosure'supervision model. This new supervision model come from China is a radical innovation for product quality supervision management.
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    Identification and Classification for Risk Paths in the Context of Cross-Border Important Data Flow
    LI Jin, SHEN Su-hao, SUN Xiao-lei, XING Xiao
    2021, 29 (3):  90-99.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.1841
    Abstract ( 387 )   PDF (1667KB) ( 145 )   Save
    With the development of information technologies, such as artificial intelligence, big data, and cloud computing, massive data areexplosively produced and collected. The global economy and collaboration have also initiated a large scale of cross-border data flow.The data transmission potentially raises risks and challenges for data security and national security. The identification and classification of risk paths work as an important component in early warning management for the cross-border flow of important data. However, previous researches focus more on the regulation and policy suggestions. There are few researches on the risk management from a quantitative perspective, and relatively few on the early warning management for illegal transmission of important data.
    Based on the complex network theory, the cross-border flow of important data are studied. First, the binary network model, including two types of nodes for data senders and receivers, is employed to simulate the cross-border data flow network. Second, the associated network is established by the common neighbor structure in the binary network. Meanwhile, the associated network can also reflect the data flow mechanism based on its transmission tendency. Third,the risk paths for important data flows across borders can be identified through the constructed binary network and its associated network. The destination risk path(DRP) algorithm, incorporating the network structure, node attribute, and data transmission frequency, is also designed to calculate the risk value for each risk path.
    By collecting the cross-border data flow from an important industry in China, empirical analyses are conducted to detect the performance of proposed methods. Risk paths are empirically identified and risk values are obtained through the above methods. Using AUC as the criterion, the comparison results indicate that our proposed DRP algorithm performs better in link prediction than those algorithms in previous literatures, such as common neighbors, Jaccard, Sørensen, and potential link prediction, etc. Furthermore, the risk classification is also provided towards an efficient data flow monitoring and management. Considering the effects of network size and node attribute, a series of robustness checks are also conducted to support the main findings.
    This paper focuses on the risk management issues emerging in the cross-border flow of important data. The methodology framework proposed in this paper can be widely used by different important industries,and benefits regulatory authorities to accurately identify and classify the potential risks existing in the cross-border data flow. A quantitative method is provided for the early warning management, effectively reducing the related risk, and furtherly improving the data governance capacity.
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    Fiscal Subsidy VS. Proprietary Trading: Study on the Government's Intervention Decision on the Supply of Public Goods under the “Catch-all” Motive
    YAO Dong-min, LI Hao-yang, ZHANG Peng-yuan
    2021, 29 (3):  100-108.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0367
    Abstract ( 373 )   PDF (1708KB) ( 118 )   Save
    One of the modern government's basic functions is to satisfy all residents' need for public goods. Hence,in contrast to other commodities, the government will be motivated to intervene the supply system of public goods once the firms which compete spontaneously in the market fail to cover all the residents' public needs. So, how can the government decide whether to intervene according to the results of market spontaneous competition? What is the standard for the government when choosing an intervention approach? How will the intervention affect the consumers' surplus in the market? Much remain to be discussed on these issues. Given the lack of literature on this issue, the government and the market coverage factor into the vertical competition structure is introduced to study how should the government makes intervention decisions in market competition. Our study differs from other similar research on vertical competition structure inmaking the market coverage factor endogenous by considering the effect of government intervention on the range of the uncovered market. The results show that:first, the boundary setting of government intervention depends on the market features of consumers' willingness to pay and firms' willingness to produce; second, the two market features also determine the feasibility range of the two intervention approaches, the subsidy approach and the proprietary approach, which implies thatthe government should make intervention decision matched for the two features' range, otherwise, the intervention could fail due to mismatch; third, to maximize the consumers' surplus, the government should choose the strategy of subsidizing high-quality firm in subsidy approach of the strategy of following high-quality firm in proprietary approach.Our theoretical findings provide not only the abstract logic in intervention decision for the government, but also practical application in reality. In real market of public goods, the government can subsidize the high-quality firm when the uncovered market is caused by the firms' low willingness to produce, and follow the high quality firm when the uncovered needs for public goods is pressing.
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    Coordination Strategies for Dual-channel Supply Chain of Fresh Agricultural Products Considering the Fresh-keeping Effort of Supplier
    CAO Xiao-ning, WANG Yong-ming, XUE Fang-hong, LIU Xiao-bing
    2021, 29 (3):  109-118.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.0489
    Abstract ( 471 )   PDF (1063KB) ( 254 )   Save
    With the rapid development of the Internet and information technology, the dual-channel marketing of fresh agricultural products becomes gradually the best choice for suppliers. It is the problem for scholars to realize the coordination of dual-channel supply chain because of the cooperative and competitive relationship between supplier and retailer.
    The models of centralized and decentralized decision-making using Stackelberg game are presented considering the loss of freshness, the influence of freshness on demand and the fresh-keeping effort of supplier in a supplier-led dual channel supply chain. Compared with centralized and decentralized decision-making models, the optimal profit of supply chain system under centralized decision-making is larger than that of decentralized. Moreover, the optimal level of fresh-keeping efforts under centralized decision-making is less than that of decentralized. The optimal level of fresh-keeping efforts is positively related to the proportion of traditional channel supply under decentralized decision-making, while it is unaffected under centralized decision-making.
    Coordination contracts are designed to increase supplier and retailer their own profits based on maximizing dual-channel supply chain system profit. The designed coordination contracts include two-part pricing contract, wholesale price contract, and hybrid strategy contract. In two-part pricing and wholesale price contracts, the profit of supplier increases because of the fixed fees retailer shared, while the additional fixed fees cannot affect the profit increase of retailer. Hybrid strategy contract is that the retailer shares part of the fresh-keeping effort cost as well as supplier shares some of his revenue to retailer. It is demonstrated those contracts could effectively realize the coordination of dual-channel supply chain and improve the profits of the members in a certain range. By comparing the designed coordination contracts, the nature of dual-channel supply chain coordination could be summarized as follows:the traditional coordination method of single channel supply chain do not apply to dual channel situations; the combination of fixed fees and traditional coordination method can realize the dual-channel supply chain coordination. Finally, the relevant model parameters are set up for numerical analysis to verify the correctness and effectiveness of the theoretical conclusions.This article will help scholars to understand the essence of the dual channel supply chain coordination of fresh agricultural products, and provide guiding strategies for the fresh business enterprises to implement the dual channel supply chain.
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    Dynamic Optimization and Coordination on Joint Carbon Emission Reduction and Advertising in a Supply Chain of Low-Carbon Goodwill Considering Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns
    YE Tong, GUAN Zhi-min, ZHANG Da-ru, QU You
    2021, 29 (3):  119-132.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.0308
    Abstract ( 270 )   PDF (2212KB) ( 157 )   Save
    Under the tremendous pressure of global climate issue, developing low-carbon economy based on low energy consumption, low emission and low pollution has gradually become a core strategy for the world to cope with climate change. The low-carbon economy mode has a great influence on supply chain's competition regulations, cost composition and ways of operation. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the theory and practice of low-carbon supply chain. Through literature review, most literature ignore the dynamic characteristics of the low-carbon level and low-carbon goodwill of the product. In addition, there is little literature of low-carbon supply chain optimization and coordination considering decision makers' Nash bargaining fairness concerned behavior. In this paper, a utility system about fairness concerns is developed based on the Nash bargaining theory, and the dynamic characteristics of low-carbon level and low-carbon goodwill are taken into consideration. The effect of each member's fairness concerns on the retailer's low-carbon advertising strategy and the manufacturer's emission reduction strategy are explored utilizing the differential games theory and method. Through the contrastive analysis, it is discovered that the low-carbon level is higher in the centralized decision-making mode. On this basis, a two-way cost-sharing contract is designed to coordinate the decentralized supply chain. Finally, based on the parameter values chosen from the previous literature (e.g. Du et al., 2015[2]; Andre et al., 2011[17]), the validity of the contract is verified and the sensitivity analysis of key parameters is also presented by a numerical example. It is shown that if the manufacturer's marginal profit rate in the total supply chain is low, the manufacturer will not invest in emission reduction. The manufacturer is willing to undertake part of the advertising cost if the parameters satisfy certain conditions. The manufacturer's fairness concerns have negative effect on the development of low carbon economy for the enterprises in the supply chain. Appropriate attention of the retailer to the fairness can increase revenues of its own and the whole supply chain system. Compared with the decentralized decision-making mode, the utility and the profit of each member in the supply chain under the two-way cost-sharing contract are all improved. In this study, the scope and content of the low-carbon supply chain optimization and coordination problem under the consideration of decision makers' behavior are enriched, and the guidance for the related application of the differential games is provided.
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    Research on the Integrated Optimization of Road Repair and Relief Distribution Based on Mobile Phone Location Data
    ZHANG Meng-ling, WANG Jing, HUANG Jun, JIAO Zi-hao
    2021, 29 (3):  133-142.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.03.13
    Abstract ( 300 )   PDF (1998KB) ( 118 )   Save
    When a sudden-onset disaster occurs, it will be difficult to distribute relief goods to the affected areas because the destruction of roads. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct research on post-disaster road repair and transport relief goods to the disaster area as soon as possible. In addition, the integrated research of road repair and relief distribution greatly improves the efficiency of the entire emergency rescue.However, because of the suddenness and uncertainty of disasters, it is difficult for decision makers to obtain enough disaster information immediately, especially victim distribution, location, disaster impact and relief demand information. The traditional methods of obtaining disaster information are usually through the on-site reporting and investigation of rescuers, and satellite images, which hinders the rapid development of rescue activities and bring about low efficiency. The popularity and wide application of mobile phoneshave made mobile phone location data provide a faster means of information acquisition for emergency rescue in disaster situations, greatly improving the efficiency of emergency rescue.
    In this paper, based on the mobile phone location data, combined with the relationship between road repair and relief distribution, a mixed integer linear programming model is established, and information is obtained such as the distribution, location, disaster impact and relief demand of the victims through mobile phone location data to achieve target road repair and relief distribution. The corresponding heuristic algorithm is designed to solve the model. Finally, the efficiency of the model and algorithm is verified by a case study. At the same time, the rescue results based on the mobile phone location data and the rescue results lacking the mobile phone location data are compared and analyzed, which proves that the mobile phone location data proposed in thispaper has more advantages inthe field of emergency rescue.
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    Pricing Strategies of Tour Operator and Online Travel Agency Based on Nash Bargaining in Promotion Model
    TAN Chun-qiao, WU Xin, CUI Chun-sheng
    2021, 29 (3):  143-152.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.0947
    Abstract ( 389 )   PDF (2261KB) ( 126 )   Save
    With the popularity of the Internet, the trend of online shopping is unstoppable, and the tourism industry has begun to try to provide customers with online ordering services to increase sales. Tour operator(TO) needs to spend a lot of manpower and material resources to open a new online travel website, while online travel agency(OTA) can hardly guarantee service differentiation under existing costs, which shows that TO and OTA are difficult to achieve results in the O2O model based solely on their own resources. Therefore, TO and OTA need to cooperate to create the O2O model. And OTA and TO can use the superior resources of both sides to complement each other. It is worth mentioning that the tourism promotion is very common and diverse. However, the existing literature lacks quantitative research on the level of tourism promotion efforts, and the existing research does not consider the linear change of TO's bargaining power. Therefore, in this paper, pricing strategies of tour operator(TO) and online travel agency(OTA) in promotion model are studied, and OTA provides online bookings for consumers, for which TO needs to pay OTA commission and provide travel services to customers who have already made online reservations. And The Nash bargaining model is constructed, in which, the TO's bargaining power is linear. In order to facilitate research, the model contains only one TO and one OTA. Firstly, the optimal pricing strategies are derived when TO bears the promotion cost, and then further the cost sharing contract is considered and the impacts on commission and promotion efforts are studied. The results show that the unit sale commission and OTA's profit decrease with TO's bargaining power, but TO's bargaining power has a positive impact on the promotion efforts, sale price, and the TO's profit. What's more, from the perspective of the profit of TO and OTA, whether the basic model or the impacts of cost sharing model is better depends on the value of the proportion of promotion cost, which is consistent with the actual situation. The promotion under the O2O model in the tourism industry is discussed, which has guiding significance for the cooperation strategies between TO and OTA.
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    Pricing, Supply, Mechanism Selection and Ration in the Presence of Strategic Purchase Demands
    LI He, LIN Zhong-gao, WU Jin-nan
    2021, 29 (3):  153-167.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0700
    Abstract ( 281 )   PDF (1135KB) ( 110 )   Save
    Once the sales period of perishable assets (such as vehicle and ship seat services, seasonal vegetable and flower products) expires, its market value is extremely low, even zero. Dynamic pricing for improving sales revenue in uncertain demand often incur consumers' strategic purchase countermeasures. Since strategic purchases depend on reference prices, while prices depend on supply and demand, dynamic pricing is a combination of static pricing and rationing is about the distribution of supply. Therefore, there should be a unified decision on the pricing, supply, mechanism selection and rationing of perishable assets with consumer behavior. This is what the existing studies ignore.
    In this paper, sales process is manifested as a two-stage pricing form (the prices in two stages are equal when static pricing is selected). Market players include the firm and high-end and low-end consumers with reserved prices of VH and VL respectively, and high-end consumers include the w strategic consumers who definitely arrived in the first stage and the X random consumers who randomly appeared in the second stage. Each consumer can only buy at most one, and enough low-end consumers can buy all the remaining goods as long as P1 or ${\tilde P_2}$ ≤ VL.The firm decides the supplyc, pricing mechanism and first-stage price P1 before sales,and the arriving strategic consumers purchase immediately when they find P1E(${\tilde P_2}$) (the mathematical expectation of price ${\tilde P_2}$ in the second stage),otherwise, wait to become the potential demand w2 for the second stage. At the moment between the two stages,X becomes an observable value, the remaining quantity of the goods is c2,and the firm chooses the second stage price ${\tilde P_2}$(${\tilde P_2}$=VH when X+w2 ≥ $\frac{{{V_L}}}{{{V_H}}}{c^2}$, others ${\tilde P_2}$=VL) according to the remaining supply and demand. In short, the firm decides perishable asset prices, supply, mechanism selection and ration strategies based on profit maximization goal,and strategic consumers set the chance of strategic purchase by anchoring the expected price. Different from the usual thinking of pricing based on utility theory, the market expected demand curve and dynamic and static pricing areas of different waiting purchase scales are firstly explored based on the anchor effect and intertemporal price equilibrium. Secondly, the frontier of effective market pricing (i.e. effective demand curve) in many expected demand curves is studied. Third, the capacity expansion line (i.e. the maximum profit curve) corresponding to the effective pricing frontier on the profit surface is found. Finally, the maximum expected profit and corresponding strategies along the capacity expansion line and the frontier of effective pricing are provided.
    The results show that the heterogeneity of consumer reserve price and the uncertainty of demands are the fundamental reasons for the existence of dynamic pricing and strategic purchases. The market has different expected demand curves in different scales of strategy waiting for purchase, and the expected demand curve in the largest-scale strategy waiting for purchase is the market effective pricing frontier. Dynamic pricing mechanism and static pricing mechanism each have their own applicable capacity and price space. Specifically, the level of the consumer's reservation price and the scale of strategic consumers determine the size of dynamic pricing space, while the different distributions of random demands only affect the shape of dynamic pricing space, i.e. affecting the demand elasticity. Meanwhile, both price increase and capacity expansion would intensify the strategic purchase degree of consumers in the area of intertemporal price equilibrium, that is, the larger the supply, the lower the pricing. Further, strategic purchases would not only reduce the supply, pricing and profits of firm, change the purchase opportunities of the high and low prices among different types of consumers, but also affect the selection of pricing mechanisms and ration strategies. Finally, reducing excess supply and virtual high price space can reduce the loss of profits caused by strategic purchases. The numerical results are consistent with the conclusions derived from the model. The results obtained from this paper can provide references for relevant studies and firms in practice.
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    Unauthorized Sharing, Pricing Divergence and Operation Strategy for Knowledge Payment Platform
    LIU Zheng-chi, HUANG Ya-wen, MA Tao
    2021, 29 (3):  168-175.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.0950
    Abstract ( 230 )   PDF (942KB) ( 97 )   Save
    In the Internet era advocating "free thinking", unauthorized sharing has become a key factor restricting the continuous output of high-quality content by knowledge providers.Under the constraints of "content king", the interest demands of knowledge providers rank the priority of knowledge payment platform.Based on the characteristics of the knowledge payment participants, a knowledge payment market model is built in this paper. Through the analysis of the pricing strategies and benefits divergence of knowledge providers and platform, the operation strategy of the knowledge payment platform in the unauthorized sharing environment is studied. The results are as follows:(1) when "moral consumers" and "ordinary consumers" coexist in the market, knowledge providers can adopt "low price strategy" and "high price strategy" respectively according to their product market confidence, and the knowledge payment platform will make the best response to it; (2) Whatever pricing strategy is adopted by knowledge providers, there is always a consistent pricing divergence (conflict of interest) between the platform and the knowledge providers. (3) The knowledge payment platform can bridge the pricing divergence by optimizing the operating parameters such as "subsidy and discovery cost", "commission and flow income", and seek to establish long-term reciprocal relationship with the knowledge providers. A theoretical support is provided for the development of the knowledge payment industry in the micro level.
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    Carbon Quota Allowance & Trading Mechanism Considering Double Heterogeneity
    LINGHU Da-zhi, WU Xin-li, YE Fei
    2021, 29 (3):  176-187.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1797
    Abstract ( 417 )   PDF (3528KB) ( 150 )   Save
    Global warming has become an important obstacle to the sustainable development of the earth. The reduction of total and unit carbon emissions has become the core of national emission reduction mechanism design.Base on this, the carbon trading supply chain is composed of government, enterprises and consumers, in which consumers buy products based on their own low carbon preference, the government makes the quota and carbon guidance price based on the optimal principle of industrial social welfare, and enterprises are engaged in the production and sales under the constraints of emission reduction mechanisms. Through the establishment of a hybrid game model, the impact of the carbon emission reduction mechanismwas compares and analyzes, which considers the dual heterogeneity. The results show that the new emission reduction mechanism can better mobilize the participation enthusiasm of consumers and enterprises in the optimization of industrial social welfare, and achieve the two-way incentives of heterogeneous enterprises to reduce emissions. The key factors are the consumer low carbon preference and the unit carbon emission difference, which affect the scheme of implementation of the mechanism and the emission reduction performance. Consumers' low carbon preferences determine the industry's optimal carbon price and quota allocation rules, and affects corporate decision-making and product prices at both active and passive levels. The unit carbon emissions difference is an important factor affecting the direction of industry's emission reduction, enterprise profit and consumer's active payment. Strict division of unit carbon emissions is conducive to the improvement of emission reduction. The quota rate is an important factor in achieving emission reduction incentives, and the difference between the quota rate and the independent quota rate is one of the causes of fluctuations in carbon price. The research also shows that too low unit carbon emission difference is not suitable forthe division of enterprise heterogeneity, and the "carbon benefit incentive" should be weakened.
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    Natural Gas Importing and Exporting Strategy under Influence of Supply Security Abroad and Domestic Infrastructure
    ZHANG Hua, ZHANG Rong
    2021, 29 (3):  188-198.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.0412
    Abstract ( 204 )   PDF (1443KB) ( 95 )   Save
    In recent years,exporting countries such as Russia often suffer from disruptions in natural gas export supply due to natural disasters, economic, political and military factors. Once the natural gas export supply security problems occur, not only the importing countries suffer enormous economic losses, the interests of the exporting countries will also be severely damaged. So gas export supply security is an important aspect that should be highly valued by the exporting countries. On the other hand, gas import for some countries such as China has risen steadily during this period. In the process of rapid development of natural gas market, the natural gas infrastructure has been improved significantly, but it is still a key factor which restricts its gas consumption. Therefore, importing countries should pay more attention to the construction of natural gas infrastructure. In this context, a dynamic game problem characterized by natural gas importing and exporting countries with conflicted interests is studied, with focus mainly on a perspective of supply security abroad and domestic infrastructure.
    Specifically, in the first section of this paper, the main players, objective functions and strategy sets are discussed, and a dynamic game model is established to reflect the importing country's economic objective and the exporting country's supply stability and economic consideration. The second section uses the optimal control theory to study the optimal strategy of the optimal sales price and infrastructure investment in the importing country, and the optimal production strategy for the exporting country. The third section mainly analyzes the optimal export price under different market scenarios. Results show that, a higher export price will lead to a higher domestic sales price and a less infrastructure investment. The exporting countries' effort has a form of inverted "U" in relation to export price. Export prices, export supply security, infrastructure stock and utility of the exporting country are higher, and utility of the importing country is lower in an exporting monopolistic market than in a monopolistic market. For an exporting monopolistic market, export prices, export supply security, infrastructure stock and utility of the exporting country are higher, and utility of the importing country is lower in the case of negotiation than in the case of cooperation.
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    Multiple Attribute Group Decision-Making Method Based on Consensus Model and ORESTE Method for Extended Probabilistic Linguistic Term Set
    LIU Pei-de, TENG Fei
    2021, 29 (3):  199-209.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0071
    Abstract ( 434 )   PDF (1494KB) ( 196 )   Save
    As a more general linguistic information representation model, extended probabilistic linguistic term set can describe original evaluation more fully and improve scientificity of decision-making. With respect to group decision-making problems under extended probabilistic linguistic environment, the group decision-making method is propased based on consensus model and ORESTE method. Firstly, the concept and relative theories of extended probabilistic linguistic term set are given. Secondly, the consensus model under extend probabilistic linguistic environment is proposed to handle with different opinions from different groups. Thirdly, the extended probabilistic linguistic ORESTE method is developed to deal with decision-making problems where there is no single order between multiple alternatives. Based on this, a novel multiple attribute group decision-making method is proposed based on consensus model and ORESTE method. Lastly, a case study about shares bicycle design scheme is used to verify the validity and rationality of the proposed method. After that, the comparisons with other existing methods are further carried out to show its rationality and advantages.
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    Research on the Function of Multi-governance Model in Internet Information Service Industry——An Evolutionary Game Perspective Based on Multi-parameter Influence
    LU An-wen, HE Hong-yang
    2021, 29 (3):  210-218.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1277
    Abstract ( 243 )   PDF (970KB) ( 118 )   Save
    The pluralistic governance in Internet information service industry requires government to actively guide socially relevant subjects to participate in the governance process. If the government do not understand the role of associations and the public in the governance process, it is easy to pursue the high participation level of both unilaterally, which makes it difficult to achieve the maximum utility of the multi-governance mode. In this paper, we use game theory to analyze the evolution of the behavioral strategies of government and Internet information service enterprises in the governance process by considering four influencing parameters:the association participation degree, the association rights space, the public participation degree, and the public reporting fairness. The study shows that improving the association rights space and the public reporting fairness can contribute the role of the multi-governance mode; when there is distortion in public reporting, the size of the government's own regulatory capacity determines the impact of public participation on the effectiveness of governance.
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    Research on the Stability of High-tech Enterprise Innovation Alliance from the Perspective of Coopetition
    SUN Kai, GUO Wen
    2021, 29 (3):  219-229.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1674
    Abstract ( 292 )   PDF (1665KB) ( 158 )   Save
    In the environment of frequent technical iterations and rapid economic development, the innovation needs and risks of high-tech enterprise innovation alliance members are gradually increasing, and innovation based on competition and cooperation becomes their only way. Pure competition or cooperation is emphasized by most of the previous studies, but as the new market environment changes, its drawbacks continue to emerge, and the coopetition strategy come into being. Therefore, based on the duality of competition and cooperation demonstrated by the innovation behavior of members of China's high-tech enterprise alliance, this paper aims at the coopetition relationship between members in the high-tech enterprise innovation alliance. From the theoretical perspective of coopetition, the factors affecting the coopetition relationship among the members of the alliance is analyzed. The evolutionary game theory is used to construct the evolutionary game model of the high-tech enterprise innovation alliance member A and B co-opetition relationship. By solving the replication dynamic equations of the ratio of the cooperation strategy between the both sides of the game, the evolutionary path of alliance members' coopetition relationship in the two cases when the synergistic benefit is not enough to make up for the risk cost and when the synergistic benefit is enough to make up for the risk cost are analyzed. And then, the strategic choices of alliance members under the influence of factors such as trust, complementarity, risk factors, and cooperative innovation discount factors are analyzed. Finally, Matlab is used to verify the above factors by numerical simulation. The result reveals that the improvement of the level of collaborative innovation trust makes the opportunistic behavior and vicious competition among the members of the alliance are effectively suppressed, and the stability of the alliance is guaranteed. In addition, the increasing complementarity among members of the alliance helps to establish a close relationship is between members, thereby the stable operation of the alliance is ensured. Moreover, the improvement of the cooperative innovation discount factor can enhance the confidence of the partners in long-term cooperation by reducing the uncertainty of future benefits of alliance members and the stable operation of the alliance is maintained. Finally, since the higher risk factor increases the risk cost of cooperative innovation, the cooperation between alliance members may evolve into a competitive relationship, and the stable development of the alliance is hindered. Based on this, high-tech enterprises should choose suitable partners according to their own situations, and the cooperative relationship with partners is effectively utilized to avoid conflicts and excessive competition. The research conclusions provide theoretical and practical reference for the high-tech enterprise innovation alliance members to effectively choose the coopetition strategy.
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    The Research on Operation Strategy of Synchronized Broadcast Program in Online Video Media
    LI Zi-qing
    2021, 29 (3):  230-238.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1530
    Abstract ( 290 )   PDF (1635KB) ( 139 )   Save
    With the popularity of simultaneous program, little is known about the operating strategy of the Program.Two online video medias are taken to provide video programs with different quality as the research object, and the optimal selection of the two online video media program provision model and online advertising pricing model are analyzed through theoretical modeling. It is found that under equilibrium conditions, users of low-quality online video media only choose its free ad-supported program, and low-quality online video media should provide free video programs and choose CPC advertising pricing model to obtain revenue through advertising; users of high-quality online video media only select its paid program. High-quality online video media should provide video programs in the charging mode to obtain revenue through program charging. The number of users of free program on low-quality online video media is greater than the number of users of high-quality online video media, and the narrowing of the difference in program quality between the two will lead to a widening of the user scale between the two. The research conclusions of this article also have certain reference significance for the traditional television media that has integrated online video programs in formulating program strategies.
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    The Impact of Market Entry for Differentiation Competitive Manufacture with Consumer Loyalty
    LI Rong-yao, LI Chao-zhu, HE Yi-xin
    2021, 29 (3):  239-248.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1687
    Abstract ( 356 )   PDF (1037KB) ( 193 )   Save
    In recent years, with the market competition becoming fiercer, more and more companies are trying to gain competitive advantages by differentiation strategies. However, the degree of product differentiation will affect consumers' purchasing choices, which may result in lower product sales and cannot compensate for the additional costs generated by the differentiation strategy, resulting in loss of corporate performance. Moreover, it is easy to find that there are still some loyal consumers in market, and these consumers will only consider purchasing products of certain brands or with certain functions, which further increases the uncertainty of the implementation of the differentiation strategy. In this context, a competitive market consisting of two manufacturers is considered. One of the manufacturers is the original supplier of the market, so be called in-place manufacturer, and the other is trying to enter the market with kind of substitute products that are different from the original products. And this paper mainly focuses on the impact of customer loyalty on the market invasion from the aspect of optimal pricing issues faced by both of the manufacturers.
    The main work in this paper includes four parts. At first, based on Consumer Utility Theory, game theory models are constructed for the cases without market invasion and with market invasion respectively, in order to find out the optimal pricing strategies and profits of each manufacturer. Second, profits of two manufacturers for each case are compared, and this paper also examines the pricing strategy of in-place manufacturer when facing with the market invasion. Third, considering the influence of product differentiation and loyalty of consumers, the impact of market invasion on two manufacturers' optimal pricing strategies and profits are analyzed. At last, for further inspiration, the impact of consumer loyalty on pricing strategies and profits of differentiated competitive manufacturers is analyzed.
    The results show that, there are four types pricing strategy for two differentiation competitive manufacturers. The incumbent manufacturer can shut the entrant manufacturer from the market when the entrant manufacturer's production costs satisfy several conditions. Moreover, the market encroachment may or may not affect the incumbent manufacturer's optimal pricing strategy, but leads to the entrant manufacturer cutting down the prices of its products and loss of profits under competitive environment. And in the case that in-place manufacturer can prevent market invasion successfully, optimal profit before market invasion will be obtained.
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