Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2021, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (3): 80-89.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1128
• Articles •
KONG Qing-shan, ZHANG Qin, YANG Hui-xin, WEN De-cheng
‘Double Random, One Disclosure’ is an innovative supervision model which proposed by the government of China and pursued in the field of market supervision. An oversight model drawing on random inspections by randomly selected law enforcement officers or inspectors and requiring the prompt release of results.For the first time, the evaluation game theory is used to construct the theoretical analysis framework of ‘Double Random, One Disclosure’ product quality supervision, the relationship between ‘Random Inspections’ and ‘Release Information’ is clarified as well as participants, the group behavior evolution of enterprise in market entity list and inspectors in law enforcers list is analyzed, the incentive mechanism is raised for the supervision model. It is found that it's not enough to quash the quality false behavior and inefficient inspection behavior by ‘Double Random, One Disclosure’. Enforcing inspection incentives for inspectors or quality incentives for enterprise separately play a role in system benign evolution when the public reputation is high enough, otherwise the system needs to enforce inspection incentives and quality incentives at the same time. Designing inspection incentives need enforcing inspection incentives for inspectors of standard quality and quality fraud, designing quality incentive need enforce quality incentives for efficient and inefficient inspections. There are great differences in the evolution track of system stable points between inspection incentives and quality incentives. The inspection incentive makes inspectors evolve to efficient inspection, then drives enterprise evolve to standard quality by reputation effect, while quality incentive make enterprise evolve to standard quality, then drives inspectors evolve to efficient inspection by reputation effect, however, the system cannot evolve to ideal state because the transmission system be cut off with lower public reputation. Finally, some suggestions are made for the government to complete and innovate'Double Random, One Disclosure'supervision model. This new supervision model come from China is a radical innovation for product quality supervision management.
product quality supervision,
KONG Qing-shan, ZHANG Qin, YANG Hui-xin, WEN De-cheng. Product Quality Supervision Model of Random Inspections[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(3): 80-89.
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