Abstract:

The pricing and subsidy strategies of ride-sharing platform are important decision issues in the operation of platform. The subsidy strategies can be divided into subsidy to driver and subsidy to passengers. The influence of the two kinds of subsidy strategies on the service of driver and the demand of passenger should be fully considered when making subsidy strategies. A Stackelberg game model is established in which platform is leader and driver is follower， the pricing and subsidy strategies of ride-sharing platform are studied，the equilibrium results of different subsidy strategies adopted by platform are compare and analyzed， and the analysis of the model is carried out through data simulation. The results show that the optimal strategy of the platform is to adopt non-subsidy strategy when the commission ratio charged by the platform is less than 1/3， and the optimal strategy for the platform is to subsidize to the driver when the commission ratio charged by the platform is more than 1/3. Compared with the platform to adopt non-subsidy strategy， the platform subsidizes to the driver could improve the service effort level of the driver and increase profit of platform. When the efficiency of service is lower than a certain threshold， the platform subsidizes to driver， which could achieve a win-win situation for the platform and the driver， and realize the total profit close to the total profit of centralized decision-making. The research conclusions provide a reference for ride-sharing platform to make pricing and subsidy strategies.

Key words: ride-sharing, effort level, Stackelberg game, pricing, subsidy