Abstract:

Considering the impact of the improvement of the social efficiency brought by transferring the dual-use defense patents to the civilian market， the dynamic licensing pricing strategy of the dual-use defense patent is studied. The dynamic no licensing model， dynamic fixed-fees licensing model and dynamic royalty licensing model considering the social efficiency are constructed. Based on this， the optimal dual-use defense patent licensing strategy of military manufacturer is studied， and the impact of discount rate and military and civilian product brand difference is analyzed. The results show that： 1） For the military manufacturer， in the short term， it is easier to obtain higher profits without licensing， but in the long run， the choice of the licensing strategy is more beneficial to the military manufacturer； 2） Compared with the dynamic fixed fee licensing model， the dynamic royalty licensing can encourage the military manufacturer to improve the social efficiency， moreover， the improved social efficiency under the dynamic royalty licensing improves the consumer utility and helps to expand the market sales， which helps the military manufacturer to get more licensing revenue and sales revenue. 3） Under the steady-state equilibrium， the no licensing strategy is more beneficial to the military manufacturer when the discount rate is lower， however， the licensing strategy will be more beneficial to the military manufacturer when the discount rate is higher. 4） When the brand power of the civilian manufacturer is weak， the royalty licensing model is optimal； others， the fixed fee licensing model is optimal.

Key words: social efficiency, dual-use defense technology, licensing pricing strategy, price competition, dynamic games