Abstract:

With the popularization of Internet technology and e-commerce， online sales has developed rapidly and brought changes into all walks of life. In order to meet the needs of different types of consumers and improve profits， more and more enterprises have set up online direct sales channels and implemented both online and offline dual channel sales mode. However， the operation of dual channel retail mode is affected by many constraints. Under this background， it is of practical significance to study the competition and coordination of dual channel supply chain. In practice， price and delivery time are two key factors that affect customers' choice of consumption channels. Delivery speed is of great importantance to cultivate the loyalty of online consumers. In terms of dual-channel supply chain decision-making， many researchers devoted themselves to the design of dual-channel supply chain coordination mechanism， but mainly assume that the product demand is known or follows a well-known distribution， which is unrealistic.Based on the above considerations， for a two-stage supply chain consisting of a manufacturer， an online retailer and a traditional retailer， the decision problem of the dual-channel supply chain under price and delivery time sensitive demand is studied. A Stackelberg-Nash game model with manufacturer as the leader and two retailers as the followers is established. With mean and variance of the demand as the only known information， the optimal pricing， ordering and lead time decisions of the dual-channel supply chain under the centralized and decentralized decision-making are presented， and the revenue sharing contract mechanism which can make supply chain perfectly coordinated is designed. Finally， numerical studies are performed to analyze the impacts of channel preference， delivery time sensitivity and price sensitivity on the optimal decision， and the corresponding management insights are summarized. The results show that the supply chain members and system profit under the coordination mechanism are better than those under the decentralized decision-making. Under the coordination mechanism and the decentralized decision-making， the retailer with a higher channel preference in the supply chain has the market advantage， while the more customers’ sensitivity to the delivery time， the lower the profit of online retailer and the higher the profit of traditional retailer. Under the same decision-making structure， the price sensitivity of different channels has the opposite effect on the profits of traditional and online retailers. The lack of demand distribution information lead to a small loss ratio， indicating that the dual-channel supply chain decision obtained based on the proposed approach in this paper can effectively hedge against the disturbance of demand uncertainty and has a good robustness.The proposed models can provide effective decision supports for the research on dual-channel supply chain decision-making and coordination under price and delivery time sensitive demand， and the results offer a scientific guidance for enterprises on how to deal with the influence of uncertain factors.

Key words: dual-channel supply chain, price and delivery-time sensitive demand, robust optimization, revenue sharing contract, game theory