地方政府异质性与区域环境合作治理——基于中国式分权的演化博弈分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.01.017

Abstract

Abstract: The implicit individual homogeneity hypothesis of traditional economics has been unable to explain the contradictory behavior of different local governments in the process of regional environmental cooperation, and the study of regional environmental cooperation governance is in trouble. The evolutionary game model of local government's bounded rationality is established from the two heterogeneity dimensions of income and preference by analyzing the transmission mechanism of local government heterogeneity under the background of Chinese decentralization system. The evolution process and its convergence trend of local government's choice of environmental cooperation strategy are discussed. The results show that the cooperation governance of regional environmental depends on the difference between local governments' income and preferences, as well as the compensation for cooperators' losses or the supervision and punishment of non-cooperators. It is helpful to improve probability of cooperation among local governments by increasing the income and supervision of the non-cooperators. Moderate preference heterogeneity is conducive to the promotion of regional environmental cooperation. The income heterogeneity between regions is not conducive to the promotion of regional environmental cooperation. However, when the income of the two local governments is equal, one party can quickly imitate the reproduction of the other party of the environmental strategy, so that adjacent local government strategy convergence. Therefore, some countermeasures and suggestions are put forward, such as strengthening environmental supervision and restraint mechanism, designing reasonably the current government incentive mechanism, and improving the environment transfer payment system between the regions, between the central and local governments, so as to promote effective implementation of China's regional environmental cooperation governance, and promote positive conversion of economic performance to environmental performance.

Key words: local government heterogeneity, regional environmental cooperation, Chinese decentralization, evolutionary game

CLC Number:

X22
F062.6

SONG Yan, CHEN Sai, ZHANG Ming. Local Government Heterogeneity and Regional Environmental Cooperation——Evolutionary Game Analysis Based on Chinese Decentralization[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(1): 201-211.

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Local Government Heterogeneity and Regional Environmental Cooperation——Evolutionary Game Analysis Based on Chinese Decentralization

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