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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2019, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (4): 79-90.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.04.008

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Decision-making and Coordination of Dual-channel Supply Chain with Consumers' Preference under Capacity Restraint

GONG Ben-gang, TANG Jia-jun, CHENG Jin-shi, LIU Zhi   

  1. School of Management Engineering, Anhui Polytechnic University, Wuhu 241000, China
  • Received:2017-01-04 Revised:2018-04-23 Online:2019-04-20 Published:2019-06-12

Abstract: Both production capacity constraint of the manufacturer and consumers' channel preference affect the members' decision-makings of dual-channel supply chain. Under capacity constraints, the problem of decision making and coordination of dual-channel supply chain members are studied considering consumer channel and low carbon dual preference in this study. A dual-channel supply chain members' decision model under the cases of centralized and decentralized decision-making is constructed, and the effects of capacity constraints, consumer channel preferences and low carbon preference on supply chain decision-making under the two cases are compared. The improved revenue sharing contract coordination mechanism is designed, and its effectiveness is proved. This study shows that:(1) In the two case, the consumer channel preference plays a promoting role in the supply chain revenue, in which the supply chain's revenue is least when the consumer channel preference is not considered under the centralized decision case. (2) The improvement of consumers' low carbon preference promotes the sales price of two kinds of channels, and then increases the supply chain revenue. (3) Under decentralized decision making, with the increase of supply chain capacity, the network direct selling channel has a larger sales growth rate than the traditional retail channel. (4) The coordination mechanism eliminates the "double marginal effect" and achieves Pareto improvement. Finally, numerical examples are given to verify above conclusions.

Key words: capacity restraint, dual-channel supply chain, consumers' preference, Stackelberg game

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