可再生能源配额制、发电厂商的策略行为与演化

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.03.017

Abstract

Abstract: The renewable portfolio standards (RPS) is a mandatory institution change for China to realize the energy low-carbon transition, and its success depends on the scientific institution design. The institution is constructive and evolutionary. RPS will coexist and evolve with power producers' strategic behavior in the long run while constructing the game rules of power producers' strategic behavior. The effects of institution quasi parameter and institutional environment related to the RPS on the strategic behavior of power producers are analyzed, based on the construction of the evolutionary game model between the RPS and the strategic behavior of power producers. The results indicate that the evolution game equilibrium between the RPS and the strategic behavior of power producers mainly depend on the relevant institution quasi parameters (such as quota, unit fine, the transaction cost of tradable green certificate market and the marginal cost margin of power producers). The scientific quota, higher unit fine, lower transaction cost and marginal cost margin can not only make the green certificate market more effective, but also make the mandatory institution change of RPS more successful. Therefore, to design the institution quasi parameters related to the RPS scientifically and strengthen the construction of institutional environment helps China to effectively implement the RPS.

Key words: renewable portfolio standards, tradable green certificates, strategic behavior, evolutionary game

CLC Number:

F407.2

ZHAO Xin-gang, REN Ling-zhi, WAN Guan. Renewable Portfolio Standards, the Strategic Behavior of Power Producers and Evolution[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(3): 168-179.

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Renewable Portfolio Standards, the Strategic Behavior of Power Producers and Evolution

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