Abstract:

Recently closed-loop supply chains have obvious cross-border characteristics. In 2020， the State Council of China issued policies that explicitly support the development of cross-border remanufacturing， so the potential of cross-border closed-loop supply chains is enormous. At the same time， when entering the host country's market， the host country's tax policy （including tariffs and corporate taxes） becomes an issue that cannot be ignored in the production decisions of original equipment manufacturers （OEMs）. An analysis of the research question stated below is presented： How do the host country's tax policies affect the provenance selection of OEMs？ How do the host country's tax policy affect remanufacturing authorization when the provenance of new products in the first stage of OEMs is uncertain？ OEMs and retailers both aim to maximize their own payoff， what are their decision preferences？ Is there a conflict of preferences？The impact of the import tariffs and the differences in corporate taxes between Foreign Direct Investment （FDI） and local enterprises on the choice of remanufacturing authorization mode in the cross-border supply chain is considered， as well as the provenance selection of OEM for new product production （OEM's home country or host country）. A cross-border closed-loop supply chain game model consisting of home country's OEM and host country's retailer is constructed， and compares the optimal decision and enterprise profit under the two remanufacturing authorization modes is compared. The results show that when OEM chooses to produce new products in different countries， the impact of tax costs on the preferences of supply chain members for remanufacturing models varies. If new products are produced in the host country， the difference in corporate taxes between FDI and local enterprises is the single influencing factor in the decision-making of OEM remanufacturing models. Regardless of whether OEM chooses to authorize remanufacturing or not， its preference for new product provenance is consistent with that of retailers， which will be affected by the import tariffs and the differences in corporate taxes between FDI and local enterprises simultaneously. In addition， the reduction of tax costs does not necessarily result in OEM reducing remanufacturing licensing fees. Therefore， OEM can select the product provenance and remanufacturing authorization decisions that are in line with its own interests according to the threshold of the host government's corporate tax policy and import tariff policy to maximize profits. Retailers can also achieve optimal profits because its preferences are consistent with OEM's. The host government can influence the decision of OEM by setting specific intervention levels of tax policies， so as to achieve better profits of domestic enterprises and encourage remanufacturing for environmental goals. The conclusion of this study has important reference significance for OEM and government decision-making under the background of intense international trade friction.

Key words: tariff, differences in corporate tax, cross-border closed-loop supply chain, remanufacturing authorisation, provenance selection