公众参与交互型跨界污染治理补偿的四方博弈

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1416

Abstract

Abstract:

Focus on cross regional environmental governance under the two-way interaction of pollution， the division of pollution responsibility is solved through public participation， and the interactive transboundary pollution control compensation mechanism based on “public supervision” and “public compensation” is explored. The quadripartite evolutionary game model of the neighboring two provinces， the central government and the public is constructed， the decision-response logic of multiple entities and the optimal formula for strategic equilibrium are discussed， and the policy optimization path is simulated and analyzed based on the 2018 regional data. The study indicates that：（1） The act of the public “whistleblowing” for rights protection has been prompted by central policy guidance and neighboring areas' pollution discharge. The improvement of environmental governance in neighboring areas is facilitated by active public participation. As diversified governance deepens， the implementation of incentive mechanisms will be transformed into the implementation of compensation mechanisms by the central government. （2） However， only when severe excess penalties， compliance incentives and whistle-blowing incentives are greater than the limit threshold， can the optimal strategy set of compliance emissions in adjacent areas， central compensation mechanisms and public whistle-blowing be promoted. （3） 'Differentiated punishment' is a necessary means to avoid the prisoners' dilemma in neighboring areas， but the implementation effect is limited to the unilateral standard， which is broken by the 'incentive mechanism'， and improved to the discharge of both sides. The result of targeted investment in pollution control costs in adjacent areas and internalizing externalities of pollution is driven by compensation mechanisms， which can effectively relieve the central government's funding pressure and restrictions on the degree of green development in the two provinces under the incentive strategy. The compensation mechanism has been optimized under key measures such as reducing additional administrative costs for the central government and increasing whistleblowing rewards for the general public. This study can be used as a reference to address the issue of interactive transboundary pollution control in regions and river basins.

Key words: transboundary pollution, pollution interaction, compensation mechanism, public participation, quadripartite evolutionary game

CLC Number:

X321

Zhi Yang. Quadripartite Evolutionary Game of Public Participation in Interactive Transboundary Pollution Control Compensation[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(8): 261-273.

Figures/Tables 12

		中央政府实施补偿机制（z）		中央政府实施激励机制（1-z）
		公众吹哨（w）	公众沉默（1-w）	公众吹哨（w）	公众沉默（1-w）
A地达标排放（x）	B地达标排放（y）	$a 1 = S - C 1 b 1 = S - C 2 c 1 = - C - r d 1 = - c + r$	$a 2 = S - C 1 b 2 = S - C 2 c 2 = - C d 2 = 0$	$a 3 = S - C 1 + R b 3 = S - C 2 + R c 3 = - 2 R d 3 = - c$	$a 4 = S - C 1 + R b 4 = S - C 2 + R c 4 = - 2 R d 4 = 0$
A地达标排放（x）	B地超标排放（1-y）	$a 5 = - C 1 - P - C 1' + 1 - e E 2 b 5 = S 2 - P - C 2' - C 2'' - E 2 c 5 = 2 P - r - C d 5 = - c - l + r + e E 2$	$a 6 = - C 1 - P - C 1' b 6 = S 2 - P - C 2' c 6 = 2 P - C d 6 = - l$	$a 7 = - C 1 - P - C 1' b 7 = S 2 - P - C 2' - C 2'' c 7 = 2 P d 7 = - c - l$	$a 8 = - C 1 - P - C 1' b 8 = S 2 - P - C 2' c 8 = 2 P d 8 = - l$
A地超标排放（1-x）	B地达标排放（y）	$a 9 = S 1 - P - C 1' - C 1'' - E 1 b 9 = - C 2 - P - C 2' + 1 - e E 1 c 9 = 2 P - r - C d 9 = - c - l + r + e E 1$	$a 10 = S 1 - P - C 1' b 10 = - C 2 - P - C 2' c 10 = 2 P - C d 10 = - l$	$a 11 = S 1 - P - C 1' - C 1'' b 11 = - C 2 - P - C 2' c 11 = 2 P d 11 = - c - l$	$a 12 = S 1 - P - C 1' b 12 = - C 2 - P - C 2' c 12 = 2 P d 12 = - l$
A地超标排放（1-x）	B地超标排放（1-y）	$a 13 = S 1 - P' - C 1' - C 1'' - E 1 + 1 - e E 2 b 13 = S 2 - P' - C 2' - C 2'' - E 2 + 1 - e E 1 c 13 = 2 P' - r - C d 13 = - c - l + r + e E 1 + e E 2$	$a 14 = S 1 - P' - C 1' b 14 = S 2 - P' - C 2' c 14 = 2 P' - C d 14 = - l$	$a 15 = S 1 - P' - C 1' - C 1'' b 15 = S 2 - P' - C 2' - C 2'' c 15 = 2 P' d 15 = - c - l$	$a 16 = S 1 - P' - C 1' b 16 = S 2 - P' - C 2' c 16 = 2 P' d 16 = - l$

均衡点	特征值 $λ 1, λ 2, λ 3, λ 4$	正负性	稳定性及条件	理想性
E₁（0,0,0,0）	$Δ P - Δ 1, Δ P - Δ 2, - C, - c$	$× × - -$	ESS（条件1）	不理想
E₂（0,0,0,1）	$Δ P + C 1'' - Δ 1, Δ P + C 2'' - Δ 2, - C - r, c$	$× × - +$	不稳定	不理想
E₃（0,0,1,0）	$Δ P - Δ 1, Δ P - Δ 2, C, r - c + e E 1 + e E 2$	$× × + ×$	不稳定	不理想
E₄（0,0,1,1）	$Δ P + C 1'' - Δ 1 + E 1, Δ P + C 2'' - Δ 2 + E 2, C + r, c - r - e E 1 - e E 2$	$× × + ×$	不稳定	不理想
E₅（0,1,0,0）	$S + R + P + C 1' - Δ 1, Δ 2 - Δ P, - C, - c$	$× × - -$	ESS（条件2）	不太理想
E₆（1,0,0,0）	$Δ 1 - Δ P, S + R + P + C 2' - Δ 2, - C, - c$	$× × - -$	ESS（条件3）	不太理想
E₇（1,0,0,1）	$Δ 1 - C 1'' - Δ P, S + R + P + C 2' + C 2'' - Δ 2, - C - r, c$	$× × - +$	不稳定	不太理想
E₈（0,1,0,1）	$S + R + P + C 1' + C 1'' - Δ 1, Δ 2 - C 2'' - Δ P, - C - r, c$	$× × - +$	不稳定	不太理想
E₉（0,1,1,0）	$S + P + C 1' - Δ 1, Δ 2 - Δ P, C, r - c + e E 1$	$× × + ×$	不稳定	不太理想
E₁₀（1,0,1,0）	$Δ 1 - Δ P, S + P + C 2' - Δ 2, C, r - c + e E 2$	$× × + ×$	不稳定	不太理想
E₁₁（0,1,1,1）	$C 1' + C 1'' + E 1 + P + S - Δ 1, Δ 2 - C 2'' - E 2 - Δ P, C + r, c - r - e E 1$	$× × + ×$	不稳定	不太理想
E₁₂（1,0,1,1）	$Δ 1 - C 1'' - E 1 - Δ P, C 2' + C 2'' + E 2 + P + S - Δ 2, C + r, c - r - e E 2$	$× × + ×$	不稳定	不太理想
E₁₃（1,1,0,1）	$Δ 1 - S - R - P - C 1' - C 1'', Δ 2 - S - R - P - C 2' - C 2'', 2 R - C - r, c$	$× × × +$	不稳定	理想
E₁₄（1,1,0,0）	$Δ 1 - S - R - P - C 1', Δ 2 - S - R - P - C 2', 2 R - C, - c$	$× × × -$	ESS（条件4）	理想
E₁₅（1,1,1,0）	$Δ 1 - S - P - C 1', Δ 2 - S - P - C 2', C - 2 R, r - c$	$× × × ×$	ESS（条件5）	理想
E₁₆（1,1,1,1）	$Δ 1 - C 1' - C 1'' - E 1 - P - S, Δ 2 - C 2' - C 2'' - E 2 - P - S, C - 2 R + r, c - r$	$× × × ×$	ESS（条件6）	理想

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Quadripartite Evolutionary Game of Public Participation in Interactive Transboundary Pollution Control Compensation

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