双积分政策下汽车企业合作创新演化博弈分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1443

Abstract

Abstract:

In order to adapt to the development of the automobile industry under the conversion of new and old kinetic energy in China， the five ministries have implemented dual-credit policy. However， a single market mechanism has not met what government expects. Therefore， a dynamic evolutionary game model of cooperative innovation of blade electric vehicle companies and oil-fueled automotive companies is constructed under or without government supervision. The impacts of factors such as NEV credit ratio， standard vehicle calculation method， and reward and punishment mechanism on the evolution of cooperative innovation are analyzed. The research shows that under the dual-credit policy， appropriately raising the requirement of NEV credit ratio helps blade electric vehicle companies quickly respond to market cooperation needs， which avoids the loss of market share caused by slow response. Besides， the correlation among various factors should be fully considered. Enhancing multiplicative coefficient contributes to innovative subjects evolving in the direction of active cooperation， which promotes the market diffusion of blade electric vehicles. Under the combined guidance of government supervision and dual-credit policy， moderately enhancing degree of awards and punishments can effectively encourage innovative subjects to evolve in the direction of active cooperation. Also， promoting function of punishment mechanism is more powerful.

Key words: blade electric vehicle, dual-credit policy, evolutionary game, cooperative innovation

CLC Number:

F224.32

Dan Zhao,Xiaochen Yan,Heping Wang,Yan Li. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cooperative Innovation of Automakers under Dual-credit Policy[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(4): 279-292.

Figures/Tables 15

符号	含义	符号	含义
$x 0 ≤ x ≤ 1$	纯电动车企积极合作的概率	$y 0 ≤ y ≤ 1$	燃油车企积极合作的概率
$Q i Q i > 0$	生产数量 $i = N, G$	$R i R i > 0$	消极合作的初始收益 $i = N, G$
$L L > 0$	积极合作获得的超额收益	$α 0 < α < 1$	收益分配系数
$C C > 0$	积极合作付出的成本	$π 0 < π < 1$	成本分摊系数
$P λ P λ > 0$	积分交易价格	$R R > 0$	纯电动车续航里程
$a a > 0$	标准车型积分计算乘性系数	$b b > 0$	标准车型积分计算加性系数
$λ N λ N > 0$	NEV积分系数	$λ G λ G > 0$	CAFC积分系数
$β β > 0$	新能源汽车积分比例要求	$k 0 < k < 1$	低油耗乘用车下降倍数
$K i K i > 0$	积极合作产生的知识溢价 $i = N, G$	$ρ i ρ i > 0$	技术储备量 $i = N, G$
$θ i θ i > 0$	技术共享度 $i = N, G$	$χ i χ i > 0$	合作创新风险系数 $i = N, G$
$S S > 0$	积极合作给予的奖励	$F F > 0$	消极合作支付的罚金

燃油车企

积极合作（y）

消极合作（1-y）

纯电动

车企

积极合作（x）

$R N + α L - π C + K G - ρ N θ N χ N + P λ ? Q N ? a ? R + Δ R + b$

$R G + 1 - α L - 1 - π C + K N - ρ G θ G χ G - k ? P λ ? Q G ? λ G + β$

$R N - π C + P λ ? Q N ? a ? R + b$

$R G - P λ ? Q G ? λ G + β + K N$

消极合作

（1-x）

$R N + P λ ? Q N ? a ? R + b + K G$

$R G - 1 - π C - P λ ? Q G ? λ G + β$

$R N + P λ ? Q N ? a ? R + b$

$R G - P λ ? Q G ? λ G + β$

$(a) α L + P λ ? Q N ? a ? Δ R > π C + ρ N θ N χ N 且 1 - α L + 1 - k P λ ? Q G ? λ G + β > 1 - π C + ρ G θ G χ G$				$(b) α L + P λ ? Q N ? a ? Δ R < π C + ρ N θ N χ N 且 1 - α L + 1 - k P λ ? Q G ? λ G + β < 1 - π C + ρ G θ G χ G$
平衡点	$D e t J 1$	$T r J 1$	稳定性	平衡点	$D e t J 1$	$T r J 1$	稳定性
$O 0,0$	+	-	ESS	$O 0,0$	+	-	ESS
$P 1 0,1$	+	+	不稳定	$P 1 0,1$	-	N	鞍点
$P 2 1,0$	+	+	不稳定	$P 2 1,0$	-	N	鞍点
$P 3 1,1$	+	-	ESS	$P 3 1,1$	+	+	不稳定
$P 4 x , y $	-	0	中心点	$P 4 x , y $	-	0	中心点

燃油车企

积极合作（y）

消极合作（1-y）

纯电动

车企

积极合作（x）

$R N + α L - π C + K G - ρ N θ N χ N + P λ ? Q N ? a ? R + Δ R + b + S$

$R G + 1 - α L - 1 - π C + K N - ρ G θ G χ G - k ? P λ ? Q G ? λ G + β + S$

$R N - π C + P λ ? Q N ? a ? R + b$

$R G - P λ ? Q G ? λ G + β + K N - F$

消极合作

（1-x）

$R N + P λ ? Q N ? a ? R + b + K G - F$

$R G - 1 - π C - P λ ? Q G ? λ G + β$

$R N + P λ ? Q N ? a ? R + b - F$

$R G - P λ ? Q G ? λ G + β - F$

$(a) α L + S + P λ ? Q N ? a ? Δ R + F > π C + ρ N θ N χ N 且 1 - α L + S + 1 - k P λ ? Q G ? λ G + β + F > 1 - π C + ρ G θ G χ G$				$(b) α L + S + P λ ? Q N ? a ? Δ R + F < π C + ρ N θ N χ N 且 1 - α L + S + 1 - k P λ ? Q G ? λ G + β + F < 1 - π C + ρ G θ G χ G$
平衡点	$D e t J 2$	$T r J 2$	稳定性	平衡点	$D e t J 2$	$T r J 2$	稳定性
$O' 0,0$	+	-	ESS	$O' 0,0$	+	-	ESS
$P 1' 0,1$	+	+	不稳定	$P 1' 0,1$	-	N	鞍点
$P 2' 1,0$	+	+	不稳定	$P 2' 1,0$	-	N	鞍点
$P 3' 1,1$	+	-	ESS	$P 3' 1,1$	+	+	不稳定
$P 4' x * , y *$	-	0	中心点	$P 4' x * , y *$	-	0	中心点

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cooperative Innovation of Automakers under Dual-credit Policy

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