绿色信贷能带动金融系统“绿色化”和企业减排吗？

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.0762

Abstract

Abstract:

Green finance is an important way to achieve sustainable economic and environmental development. China has actively built green finance reform and innovation pilot areas to explore the development model of green finance. At present， China’s green financial products are dominated by green credit. Under the background of the “double carbon” goal， how to attract more financial subjects to participate in the green financial market to enrich and innovate green financial products and services is the key to China’s green financial development and also affects the realization of the “double carbon” goal. A three-party evolutionary game model of “banking financial institutions， non-banking financial institutions， and enterprises” is built to explore whether green credit can drive the “greening” of the entire financial system， thus providing more green funds for low-carbon projects to promote energy conservation and emission reduction of enterprises. The results show that：（1） The willingness of banking financial institutions to implement green credit has a signal effect on the development of green financial markets. When the initial willingness of banking financial institutions to “implement” green credit is high， it will promote enterprises to participate in energy conservation and emission reduction， and attract non-banking financial institutions to enter the green financial market；（2） When the initial willingness of each subject to participate in green financial development is low， the game can still reach the ideal equilibrium state by increasing the policy incentives of financial supervision departments and reducing the income gap between traditional projects and green projects；（3） When the initial willingness of each subject to participate in the green financial development is high， through the enhancement of the synergistic premium effect between financial institutions in the market， the enhancement of the environmental pollution punishment of financial institutions， and the compression of risk returns， all subjects will be able to converge to the ideal equilibrium state faster. Based on the above analysis， this paper puts forward corresponding policy recommendations.

Key words: green credit, banking financial institutions, non-banking financial institutions, enterprise emission reduction, evolutionary game

CLC Number:

F832.5

Jiayu Zheng, Yi Hu. Can Green Credit Drive the “Greening” of the Financial System and Enterprise Emission Reduction?Based on Evolutionary Game Analysis[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(12): 288-299.

Figures/Tables 15

银行金融机构	非银行金融机构进入（ $z$ ）		非银行金融机构不进入（ $1 - z$ ）
银行金融机构	企业减排（ $y$ ）	企业不减排（ $1 - y$ ）	企业减排（ $y$ ）	企业不减排（ $1 - y$ ）
实施（ $x$ ）	(A₁，B₁，C₁)	(A₂，B₂，C₂)	(A₃，B₃，C₃)	(A₄，B₄，C₄)
不实施（ $1 - x$ ）	(A₅，B₅，C₅)	(A₆，B₆，C₆)	(A₇，B₇，C₇)	(A₈，B₈，C₈)

策略	银行金融机构	企业	非银行金融机构
(A₁，B₁，C₁)	$r 1 - c +$ g $+ a + e$	$r 3 - f 1$	$r 2 + b + e$
(A₂，B₂，C₂)	$r 1 - c +$ g $+ a$	$r 3 - i 1$	$r 2 + b$
(A₃，B₃，C₃)	$r 1 - c +$ g $+ e$	$r 3 - f 1$	$r 2 + v$ $- l 2 + e$
(A₄，B₄，C₄)	$r 1 - c +$ g	$r 3 - i 2$	$r 2 + v$ $- l 2$
(A₅，B₅，C₅)	$r 1 + ϕ$ $- l 1 + e$	$r 3 - f 2$	$r 2 - f + e$
(A₆，B₆，C₆)	$r 1 + ϕ$ $- l 1$	$r 3$	$r 2 - f$
(A₇，B₇，C₇)	$r 1 + ϕ$ $- l 1 + e$	$r 3 - f 2$	$r 2 + e$
(A₈，B₈，C₈)	$r 1 + ϕ$ $- l 1$	$r 3$	$r 2$

均衡点	$λ 1$	$λ 2$	$λ 3$
E₁(0, 0, 0)	$- c + g - ϕ + l 1$	$- f 2$	$- f$
E₂(0, 0, 1)	$a - c + g - ϕ + l 1$	$- f 2$	$f$
E₃(0, 1, 0)	$- c + g - ϕ + l 1$	$f 2$	$- f$
E₄(1, 0, 0)	$c - g + ϕ - l 1$	$- f 1 + i 2$	$b - v + l 2$
E₅(0, 1, 1)	$a - c + g - ϕ + l 1$	$f 2$	$f$
E₆(1, 0, 1)	$- (a - c + g - ϕ + l 1)$	$- f 1 + i 1$	$- (b - v + l 2)$
E₇(1, 1, 0)	$c - g + ϕ - l 1$	$f 1 - i 2$	$b - v + l 2$
E₈(1, 1, 1)	$- (a - c + g - ϕ + l 1)$	$f 1 - i 1$	$- (b - v + l 2)$

	情形1				情形2				情形3
均衡点	$λ 1$	$λ 2$	$λ 3$	稳定性	$λ 1$	$λ 2$	$λ 3$	稳定性	$λ 1$	$λ 2$	$λ 3$	稳定性
E₁(0, 0, 0)	+	-	-	不稳定	-	-	-	ESS	-	-	-	ESS
E₂(0, 0, 1)	+	-	+	不稳定	+	-	+	不稳定	-	-	+	不稳定
E₃(0, 1, 0)	+	+	-	不稳定	-	+	-	不稳定	-	+	-	不稳定
E₄(1, 0, 0)	-	不确定	+	不稳定	+	不确定	+	鞍点	+	不确定	+	鞍点
E₅(0, 1, 1)	+	+	+	鞍点	+	+	+	鞍点	-	+	+	不稳定
E₆(1, 0, 1)	-	+	-	不稳定	-	+	-	不稳定	+	+	-	不稳定
E₇(1, 1, 0)	-	不确定	+	不稳定	+	不确定	+	鞍点	+	不确定	+	鞍点
E₈(1, 1, 1)	-	-	-	ESS	-	-	-	ESS	+	-	-	不稳定

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Can Green Credit Drive the “Greening” of the Financial System and Enterprise Emission Reduction?Based on Evolutionary Game Analysis

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