Abstract:

With the prosperity and development of the platform economy， problems such as online counterfeit sales， false information and piracy and infringement occur frequently on the platform. The government attach great importance to the problem of platform economic governance in our country， and have introduced a number of policy documents in order to balance the two important goals of “regulation” and “development”. As for platform economic governance issues， the focus of current academic studies is mostly focused on the emphasis on the implementation of a relatively strict and strong supervision mode for platform economy， and few scholars include “development” and “norms” into the research scope of governance strategy formulation， which makes it difficult for platform economic governance strategies to achieve in-depth promotion， moderate advance and orderly implementation. It failed to effectively promote the healthy and sustainable development of Chinese platform economy. Therefore， it has become a key topic to explore the role of both regulatory norms and development promotion policies in platform economic governance， as well as effective measures to give full play to the role of both policies. In this paper， evolutionary game theory and Markov chain method are comprehensively applied. Based on the stochastic characteristics of the state evolution of the platform economic governance game system， Markov transition probability matrix under the effect of equal emphasis policy is constructed. MATLAB is used to simulate the probability change trend of the system state after n-stage iteration， and the role of equal emphasis policy on the platform economic governance is explored. Then， according to the modified strategy of emphasizing the role of the policy， the correlation analysis of key parameters with Maple is carried out， and the countermeasures are proposed by comprehensively considering the conditions affecting the play of the role. The findings are as follows： the implementation of equal emphasis policy has a positive effect on platform economic governance， but at the same time， there is a risk of increasing the probability of illegal operation of merchants. Strict supervision by the government or active review by the platform to guide merchants to operate in compliance is an effective correction strategy to give full play to the role of both policies， and the correction effect is the best when both the government and the platform fulfill their duties. Keeping the efficiency of information transfer between the government and the platform and the probability of public reporting at a high level is an important direction for deepening the application of the policy of equal importance in the future. It provides a new perspective and method of analysis for future scholars to better explore the issues of platform economic governance in this study.

Key words: platform economy, evolutionary game, markov, regulatory norms, promote the development