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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2016, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (3): 117-124.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.03.014

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Design and Analysis of Compensation Contract Model: Based on the Duality of Subsidiary Behavior

LUO Biao, CHEN Shuai   

  1. School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
  • Received:2014-02-15 Revised:2014-07-28 Online:2016-03-20 Published:2016-03-18

Abstract: For the changes of subsidiary behaviors caused by role changes, subsidiary behaviors are firstly divided into exploratory behavior and exploitative behavior. In order to explore the influence of relevant decision variables on dualistic behaviors of subsidiary, the principal-agent theory is used to design a compensation contract model. The results show that: the optimal output sharing coefficient and the exploitative effort level will decrease with the raise of headquarters support level and the reduction of exploitative profitability, and they shows the tendency of "positive U shape" with the raise of subsidiary input and expected rate of exploratory return. If the subsidiary input or the expected rate of exploratory return is very low, the exploratory effort level shows the tendency of "inverted U shape" with the raise of headquarters support level. Otherwise, it shows the tendency of increase. Besides, the exploratory effort level will improve with the raise of exploitative profitability, expected rate of exploratory return and subsidiary input. Finally, this paper gives a visual display of the conclusions by a numerical example. Some theoretical references are provided for headquarters to control subsidiary dualistic behaviors effectively by the optimal incentive mechanism and resource support, and a new direction is provided for the study of subsidiary dualistic behaviors by deductive method.

Key words: exploratory behavior, exploitative behavior, compensation contract, principal-agent

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