考虑声誉效应的存货质押融资中银行对物流企业的激励机制研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.07.010

Abstract

Abstract: The logistics company plays an important role in the inventory financing business. The effort level of the logistics company is one of key factors related to the successful operation of inventory financing. In this paper, a principal-agent model that combines explicit incentive mechanism with implicit incentive mechanism is established by considering reputation effects. A comparison between two scenarios considering reputation effect and not considering reputation effect is made. It is found that the effort level, the single stage income of bank, and the incentive coefficient will increase as considering reputation effect.However,the fixed payment to the logistics companiesby the bank will decrease. Furthermore, the logistics company will improve effort level more positively if the bank establishes a long-term relationship withthe logistics company. Finally, the relevant conclusions are verified by a numerical exampleand some recommendations are provided.

Key words: inventory financing, reputation effect, principal-agent, incentive mechanism

CLC Number:

C931.2

LI Jian, WANG Ya-jie, WU Jun, YANG Feng-mei. Research on Incentive Mechanism of Banks to Logistics Company in Inventory Financing Considering Reputation Effect[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2017, 25(7): 86-92.

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Research on Incentive Mechanism of Banks to Logistics Company in Inventory Financing Considering Reputation Effect

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