基于消费者需求差异和渠道权力结构差异的MT-CLSC定价、效率与协调研究

Abstract

Abstract: Compared with other recycling model of closed-loop supply chain, closed-loop supply chain of manufacturer taking-back (MT-CLSC) is more effective in saving the cost and increasing the system profit. According to the power structure differences of MT-CLSC channel, and considering customers' different preferences and its influence to new products and remanufactured products, four types of MT-CLSC models are constructed in this paper, which are the centralized cooperative decision-making model of manufacturers and retailers, the decentralized decision-making model of either manufacturers power greater than retailers, or less than retailers, and the decentralized decision-making model of manufacturers power equaling to retailers. According to the characteristics of each model, optimal pricing strategies, recovery strategies and corresponding profits and channel efficiency are calculated and compared then by numerical analysis method. The following conclusions are given: (1) in each model, channel profit and MT-CLSC members profits decreases with the increase of the customer preference coefficient; (2) under decentralized decisions, the profits of manufacturers and retailers were associated with their power. Greater the power is, more is the profit; (3) under decentralized decisions, when the power of manufacturers is equal to retailers, the channel efficiency is the highest, and when the power of retailers is greater than manufacturers, the channel efficiency is the lowest; (4) the centralized cooperative decision-making model of manufacturers and retailers is the optimal model. In this model, the prices of the new products and remanufactured products are the lowest, and the recycling-demand rate of the waste is the lowest, while the channel profit is the highest. However, this model can only be achieved through coordination mechanism. Therefore, an effective coordination mechanism which can achieve the centralized mode is further designed. The conclusions would be helpful to enrich the closed-loop supply chain theory and popularize the application of closed-loop supply chain in reality.

Key words: differences in customer demand preference, channel power, closed-loop supply chain

CLC Number:

F406.7
F224

WANG Yu-yan, SHEN Liang. Pricing, Efficiency, and Coordination in MT-CLSC Considering Differences in Customer Demand and Differences Channel Power Structures[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(6): 34-42.

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Pricing, Efficiency, and Coordination in MT-CLSC Considering Differences in Customer Demand and Differences Channel Power Structures

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