主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2012, Vol. ›› Issue (1): 161-170.

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The Effect of Signal Strategies in C2C E-marketplaces

XIAO Jun-ji1, LIU Lin2   

  1. 1. Management School, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China;
    2. Economy and management School, Shunghai University of Electric Power, Shanghai 200433, China
  • Received:2009-12-20 Revised:2011-08-20 Online:2012-02-29 Published:2012-03-09

Abstract: Using the discrete choice model and the differentiated Bertrand- equilibrium model proposed by Berry et al.(1995)[2] and data from Taobao.com, this paper examines the effectiveness of four signaling strategies:reputation, Buyer Protection Program, warranty services and information disclosure,by studying both the demand and the supply sides of the market. The results of demand side indicate that for the present trust mechanism in Taobao.com, the "7-Day" program in BPPs and warranty services can signal product quality. However, the "indemnity in advance" program in BPPs and reputation cannot lead to a partial separating equilibrium in the present of more effective signaling strategies. The results of supply side suggest that information disclosure can increase the probability of buyers purchase, but it cannot signal quality since it is easy for low-quality sellers to mimic the strategy of the high-quality sellers. This is the first study to analyze the mechanism and effect of signal strategies from both demand side and supply side.

Key words: trust, signal, online trading

CLC Number: