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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2010, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (2): 62-67.

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Study on Premium and Penalty Mechanisms for the Electronic Product Reverse Supply Chain Considering the Leading of Government

WANG Wen-bin1, DA Qing-li2   

  1. 1. School of Management, China University of Mining and Technology, Xuzhou 221116, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
  • Received:2009-04-29 Revised:2010-03-18 Online:2010-04-30 Published:2010-04-30

Abstract: This paper studies the decision-making problem about the electronic product reverse supply chain's premium and penalty mechanism. The optimal parameters of the mechanism are discussed Four decision-making models are established,and the results of these models are compared Several conclusions are derived The collection rate of reverse supply chain increases with the premium and penalty mechanism. The profit of the collector with the premium and penalty mechanism is higher than the profit of the collector without the mechanism,and thus,the collector's enthusiasm increases. Moderate target collection rate level and a high premium and penalty degree can increase the manufacturer's profit,and thus,the manufacturer's enthusiasm increases The waste product's buy-back price increases while the new product's price decreases with the premium and penalty mechanism.

Key words: reverse supply chain, premium and penalty mechanism, collection, remanufacturing

CLC Number: