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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2025, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (2): 195-206.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1858

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Cost Allocation Strategy of Joint Procurement with Level Coalition Structures and Uncertain Demand

Jie Yang1, Xin Zhang1, Dengfeng Li2()   

  1. 1.College of Economics and Management,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,China
    2.School of Economics and Management,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 610054,China
  • Received:2022-08-23 Revised:2023-03-06 Online:2025-02-25 Published:2025-03-06
  • Contact: Dengfeng Li E-mail:lidengfeng@uestc.edu.cn

Abstract:

In the procurement of real economic activities, enterprises tend to jointly purchase with other purchasers to reduce procurement costs. When the coalition continues to expand, a larger coalition will be formed, and the coalition structure level is reflected in this formation process. For joint procurement alliances with level coalition structure, the cost allocation problem of such joint procurement is studied with consider the uncertainty of demand in actual procurement, to provide theoretical basis and method support for the selection of joint procurement strategies among players (relationship). In order to solve the problem of joint procurement cost allocation with level coalition structures and uncertain demand, the interval τ-value allocation solution of cooperative game with coalition structure is defined, which can be expressed as τi(v¯)=[mi+α-(Mi-(v)-mi),mi+α+(Mi+(v)-mi)]. The specific construction process as follows: (1) Firstly, the interval-value is adopted to describe the fuzziness of demand, and the condition of union monotonicity is defined, namely v+(S)-v-(S)v+(S\i)-v-(S\i). This method to perform interval subtraction can effectively avoid the problem of fuzzy number inversion. (2) Secondly, the condition of union monotonicity is introduced into the classical level coalition structure cooperative game model, and the definition of the interval-value cooperative game of the level coalition structure is given. (3) Then, this game model is introduced into classical cooperative game τ-value model to construct the cooperative game τ-value model of the interval-value with the coalition structure. (4) In addition, the axiomatic of individual rationality and overall effectiveness are proved of this model. (5) Lastly, in order to prove the effectiveness and practicality of the model, the method is applied to the real case of "Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei + Shandong" joint procurement of COVID-19 reagents. The conclusions of this paper are drawn: (1) Compared with real number research, fuzzy number research is more scientific and accurate. (2) The level coalition structure has a significant impact on the cost allocation strategy of joint procurement, that is, when the purchase quantity is the same, the closer the alliance is, the more cost will be saved by joint procurement. Therefore, members can increase their bargaining power by becoming key players to save more procurement costs.

Key words: level coalition structures, uncertain demand, cost allocation, joint procurement, τ-value')">τ-value

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