外卖配送无人接单问题的平台监管与商家激励策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1578

Abstract

Abstract:

The problem of unattended delivery orders in O2O food delivery services is caused by unreasonable allocation of crowd-sourcing riders，but its essence is the revenue distribution mechanism（i.e.catering merchant incentive strategy）issue and delivery platform supervision issue.In this article，it focuses on two platform charging modes and two platform supervision methods，platform supervision effort，merchant cash incentive and rider delivering effort are considered，four tripartite game models are built whose players are the same，including the delivery platform，the catering merchant and the crowd-sourcing riders，and Nash equilibrium is solved to get the optimal decisions and profit.It is found that：（1）After introducing platform supervision and merchant cash incentive，the number of orders the riders accept and the riders’profit are both improved.（2）If the merchant chooses to provide incentives，all gross profit of the product will be used as incentive.When the product’s gross profit does not exceed 2/3 of the product’s price，platform supervision and merchant incentives may bring additional profits to the merchant.（3）Rider delivering effort is related to platform charging modes.

Key words: food delivery, unattended orders, platform supervision, merchant incentive, tripartite game

CLC Number:

O225

Tian Tian, Huijing Yuan, Jiafu Tang, Yuxue Liu. Research on Platform Supervision and Merchant Incentive Strategies for Unattended Food Delivery Orders[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(2): 184-194.

Figures/Tables 6

符号		含义
决策变量	$s f$	DM方式下平台对餐饮商家的监管力度
	$s r$	DM方式下平台对骑手的监管力度
	$s$	CM方式下平台对餐饮商家与骑手整体的监管力度
	$β$	餐饮商家激励金额与产品价格的比例系数，简称激励系数
	$e$	骑手完成配送服务的努力程度
系统参数	$p$	消费者支付的订单价格
	$p f$	餐饮商家销售的产品价格
	$α$	产品成本与产品价格的比例系数
	$M$	FC模式下平台向餐饮商家收取的固定管理费
	$θ$	FC模式下每笔订单服务费与订单价格的比例系数
	$η$	VC模式下每笔订单的抽佣比例
	$q 1$	DM方式下平台对餐饮商家(骑手)监管力度的成本系数
	$q 2$	CM方式下平台对餐饮商家与骑手集中监管力度的成本系数
	$m$	每笔订单平台给予骑手的固定配送费用
	$k$	骑手接单的成本系数
	$A 0$	固有骑手接单量
	$D 0$	固有平台订单量
	$A$	骑手接单量
	$D$	平台订单量
	$ε 1$	DM方式下接单量(订单量)对餐饮商家(骑手)监管力度的敏感系数
	$ε 2$	CM方式下接单量(订单量)对餐饮商家与骑手集中监管力度的敏感系数
	$ε b$	接单率对餐饮商家激励金额的敏感系数
	$ε e$	接单率(订单量)对骑手服务质量努力程度的敏感系数

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Research on Platform Supervision and Merchant Incentive Strategies for Unattended Food Delivery Orders

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