双边市场网约车平台聚合策略选择研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1105

Abstract

Abstract:

Rapid fragmentation of the ride-hailing market has led to issues like “difficulty in getting a car during peak periods and low user matching rate，” for which resource-based businesses like Amap have begun to develop an integration model in which various travel service providers come together on an integrated platform to provide services to customers. Integration models can significantly aid small ride-hailing platform market entry， competition， and profit， however there is some influence from the growth of big platform firms. How to choose the integration approach for ride-hailing platforms is a crucial matter in light of this integration background. Using the two-sided market of ride-hailing as a backdrop， a duopoly platform competition model is developed based on the Hotelling model， which includes an integration platform（I） of small platforms（A） and a large platform（B）， and the integration strategy selection of large platform in different market environments and user characteristics is investigated. In this paper， the bilateral market size decisions， platform bilateral pricing decisions， and the impact of pricing on customers shifting under the non-integration strategy （N）， follow strategy （F）， and open strategy （O） are theoretically derived. Further， numerical simulations are conducted to compare the profit levels of large platforms under different integration strategies. Cross-side network effect and customer’s travel cost are major factors influencing the adoption of large-scale platform integration solutions， according to the findings. Large-scale platforms prefer not to participate in integration when the customer-side and driver-side Cross-side network effects are both low. When the customer’s travel cost is below a certain threshold， the large platform adopts the follow strategy； otherwise， it does not participate in the integration. Interestingly， neither the driver's travel cost nor the commission ratio of the integration platform will affect the choice of large-scale platform integration strategy， which might explain the integration platform’s early stage-free development strategy in reality.

Key words: two-sided market, ride-hailing platform, integration strategy, cross-side network effect

CLC Number:

F272

Yu Cao, Xiang Li, Qingsong Li. The Integration Strategy Selection of Ride-hailing Platform under the Two-sided Market[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(4): 142-153.

Figures/Tables 15

参数	符号说明	参数	符号说明
$θ c$	用户固定效用	$θ d$	司机固定效用
$U c A B$	用户通过平台A和B出行的效用	$U c A$	用户通过小平台集合A出行的效用
$U c B$	用户通过大平台B出行的效用	$U d A B$	司机通过平台A和B出行的效用
$U d A$	司机通过小平台集合A出行的效用	$U d B$	司机通过大平台B出行的效用
$n c A B$	平台A和B共享的用户规模	$n c A$	小平台集合A的用户规模
$n c B$	大平台B的用户规模	$n d A$	小平台集合A的司机规模
$n d B$	大平台B的司机规模	$λ$	聚合平台的抽成比例
$β c$	用户端交叉网络外部性强度	$β d$	司机端交叉网络外部性强度
$p A$	小平台集合A的用户定价	$p B$	大平台B的用户定价
$w A$	小平台集合A的司机定价	$w B$	大平台B的司机定价
$t c$	用户旅行成本	$t d$	司机旅行成本
$c$	聚合成本

参数	$n c A$	$n c B$	$n d A$	$n d B$
$p A$	↓	↑	↓	↑
$w A$	↓	↑	↓	↑
$p B$	↑	↓	↑	↓
$w B$	↑	↓	↑	↓

参数	$n c A$	$n c A B$	$n c B$	$n d A$	$n d B$
$p A$	-	↓	↑	↓	↑
$w A$	-	↓	↑	↓	↑
$p B$	↑	↓	↓	↑	↓
$w B$	-	↑	↓	↑	↓

参数	$n c A$	$n c A B$	$n c B$	$n d A$	$n d B$
$p A$	↓	↓	↑	↓	↑
$w A$	↓	↑	-	↓	↑
$p B$	↑	↓	-	↑	↓
$w B$	↑	↓	-	↑	↓

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The Integration Strategy Selection of Ride-hailing Platform under the Two-sided Market

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