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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2017, Vol. 25 ›› Issue (5): 17-24.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.05.003

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Pricing Analysis of Merger Strategy in Two-Sided Markets

LIU Wei-qi1,3, ZHANG Su2   

  1. 1. Institute of Management and Decision, Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China;
    3. Faculty of Finance and Banking, Shanxi University of Finance and Economics, Taiyuan 030006, China
  • Received:2016-06-29 Revised:2017-01-12 Online:2017-05-20 Published:2017-08-26

Abstract: The merger behavior of platform has been increasing in recent years. The existing research literatures on merger strategy of two-sided markets are still less, and more focused on single-dimensional analysis, that is, vertical merger or horizontal merger analysis. There is no literature that had examined the comparison analysis of pricing strategy of two-sided platform under different merger structures. Considering that, in order to analyze the pricing mechanism problem of two sided platform under different merger structures, this paper constructs a game model, assuming that there are two competing platforms existed in the market and two sided users are single-homing. Based on the model, firstly, it discusses the pricing mechanism of the two-sided platforms under the conditions of no merger, vertical merger and horizontal merger structures. Secondly, the equilibrium solutions obtained by solving the profit maximization problem under different situations are compared and analyzed. Thirdly, the effect of network externality intensity on platform pricing, market share and platform profit under different merger structures is investigated. Research results show that in the aspect of pricing, the complementary products are priced at the lowest level under vertical merger and the highest under horizontal merger, while the users' access fee is related to the intensity of network externality. When network externality intensity is small, the users' access fee is at the highest level under vertical merger and the lowest under horizontal merger; In the aspect of profit, the highest platform profit is obtained under vertical merger. When network externality intensity is small, the platform profit is the lowest under horizontal merger; With the increase of network externalities intensity, the platform profit and the users' access fee are higher, while the price of complementary products for consumers is lower. These conclusions provide an important theoretical basis and referential significant for platform companies to adopt different merger strategies.

Key words: two-sided markets, horizontal merger, vertical merger, network externality

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