Abstract:

Prices and service levels are the main decision-making issues in the daily operation of shared mobility platforms. Based on the different stages of competitive development of shared mobility platforms， decision-making models are constructed for prices and service levels of two platforms under different competition modes， the equilibrium results of different models are solved， and the decisions and profits under different models of game equilibrium are compared and analyzed. This provides theoretical support for the price and service decisions of two platforms in different stages of competition development and verifies the relevant conclusions through case analysis. The research indicates that： Introducing service competition is conducive to improving the service level of shared mobility platforms； when there is a significant difference between the two platforms， under the service competition mode， the platform with high commission rates demonstrates a competitive advantage in service， and profits increase with the degree of competition enhancement； when the service cost coefficient is low， the platform with low commission rates seizing the market with price advantages is the dominant strategy； when platforms adopt a service competition mode， the degree of change in shared service system revenue caused by changes in platform service levels is higher than the degree of change in platform revenue. The results provide a theoretical basis for the price and service level decisions of shared mobility platforms under different competition modes in different periods.

Key words: ride-sharing, price, service, competition mode