基于双重信息非对称的排污权交易机制与最优环境政策设计

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.11.022

Abstract

Abstract: An emission trading mechanism design model is constructed under information asymmetry of pollution and abatement cost. The design of optimal emission trading mechanism is discussed and the optimal environmental policy is given. The result shows that when firm voluntarily abides the law, the government should set the level of supervision at a reasonable level. When firm choose illegal pollution, the government forces the firm to abide thelaw. At this point, government needs to choose an suitable penalties. A theoretical basis for the decision-making of the government's pricing, distribution mechanism, environmental regulation is provided.

Key words: emission trading, government supervision, punishment mechanism

CLC Number:

F062.9

LI Dong-dong, LV Hong-jun, LI Pin, YANG Jing-yu. Emission Trading Mechanism and Environment Policy Design under Information Asymmetry of Abatement Costandpollution[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(11): 219-230.

References

[1] 金帅,吴苏闽,蒋思琦.排污权价格随机情境下基于CVaR准则的企业生产决策[J].中国管理科学.https://doi.org/10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0064.
[2] 金帅,顾敏,盛昭瀚,等.考虑排污权市场价格不确定性的企业生产决策[J].中国管理科学,2020,28(4):109-121.
[3] 王金南,董战峰,杨金田,等.排污权交易制度的最新实践和展望[J].环境经济,2008,(10):31-45.
[4] Dasgupta A,Sinhab B.A new general interpretation of the Stein estimate and how it adapts:Applications[J].Journal of Statistical Planning&Inference,1999,75(2):247-268.
[5] Harford J.Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1978,(5)26-43.
[6] Harford J.Self-reporting of pollution and the firm's behavior under imperfectly enforceable regulations[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1987,(14):293-303.
[7] SegerSon K,Tietenberg T.The structure of penalties in environmental enforcement an economic analysis[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1992,(23):179-200.
[8] Konishi H. Intergovernmental versus intersource emissions trading when firms are noncompliant[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,2005,49(2):235-261.
[9] Stranlund J.The regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs[J].Environment Resource Economic,2007,38(7):99-117.
[10] 祝飞,赵勇.不对称控制成本信息下的环境管理机制设计[J].华中科技大学学报(自然科学版),2000,28(8):21-23.
[11] 张倩,曲世友.环境规制下政府与企业环境行为的动态博弈与最优策略研究[J].预测,2013, (4):35-40.
[12] 王宪恩,王庚哲.排污权交易制度下最优监管机制的建立[J].东北师大学报(自然科学),2016,48(2):148-154.
[13] 王先甲,黄彬彬,胡振鹏,等.排污权交易市场中具有激励相容性的双边拍卖机制[J].中国环境科学, 2010, 30(6):845-851.
[14] 高广鑫,樊治平. 考虑投标者后悔的一级密封拍卖的最优投标策略[J]. 管理科学, 2016, 29(1):1-14.
[15] 郑君君,王向民,朱德胜,等. 考虑学习速度的小世界网络上排污权拍卖策略演化[J]. 中国管理科学, 2017(3):76-84.
[16] 杨晶玉,李冬冬. 基于双边减排成本信息不对称的排污权二级交易市场拍卖机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2018, (8):146-153.
[17] Stranlund J, Chavez C. Effective enforcement of a transferable emissions permit system with a self-reporting requirement[J].Journal of Regulatory Economics,2000,18:113-131.
[18] MacKenzie M.Optimal monitoring of credit-based emissions trading under asymmetric information[J]. Journal of Regulatory Economics,2012,42(2):180-203.
[19] 陈德湖,李寿德,蒋馥.排污权交易市场中的厂商行为与政府管制[J].系统工程,2004,22(3):44-46.
[20] 金帅,盛昭瀚,杜建国.排污权交易系统中政府监管策略分析[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(4):174-183.
[21] 李冬冬,杨晶玉.基于跨期排污权交易的最优环境监管策略[J].系统管理学报,2017,26(7):1-8.
[22] 杨磊,郑晨诗,纪静娜.碳信息不对称下的供应链谎报决策与协调研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(4):111-120.
[23] Stranlund J K. Enforcing emissions trading when emissions permits are bankable[J]. Journal of Regulatory Economics,2005, 28(2):181-204.
[24] McDonald S,Poyago-heotoky J. Research joint ventures and optimal emissions taxation[J]. Journal of Cosmetic Dentistry, 2012:1-28.
[25] Larry Q. On the dynamic efficiency of bertrand and cournot equilibria[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1997, 75(1):213-229.

Emission Trading Mechanism and Environment Policy Design under Information Asymmetry of Abatement Costandpollution

PDF (PC)

Knowledge

Abstract

Cite this article

share this article

References

Related Articles 7

Metrics

Comments

Recommended 10

[1]	GUO Han-ding, ZHANG Yin-xian, TAO Kai. Mechanism of Multi Level Interest Distribution and Incentive Coordination in the Government Supervision of Engineering Quality [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(2): 170-178.
[2]	YANG Jing-yu, LI Dong-dong. Emission Trading Auction Mechanism Design Based on Bilateral Abatement Cost Information Asymmetry [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2018, 26(8): 146-153.
[3]	YAN Bing-qian, QIAO Hai, WANG Shou-yang. The Short-term and Medium-term Impact of Carbon Trading Mechanism on Chinese Industries [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2017, 25(7): 1-10.
[4]	GUO Han-ding, HAO Hai, ZHANG Yin-xian. Analysis on Agency Chain and Research on Multi-level Incentive Mechanism of Project Quality Government Supervision [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2017, 25(6): 82-90.
[5]	ZHANG Jun-rong, WANG Zi-dan, TANG Ling, YU Le-an. The Simulation of Carbon Emission Trading System in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region: An Analysis Based on System Dynamics [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(3): 1-8.
[6]	HUANG Min-mei. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cooperation Mechanism for Collaborative Product Development in Supply Chain [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2010, 18(6): 155-162.
[7]	YANG Zhen-ning, LI Dong-hong. Government Supervision, Eel Effect and Intellectual Property Rights Management:Enterprises’ Innovation Performance Promotion [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2010, 18(6): 177-184.