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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2019, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (2): 170-178.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.02.017

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Mechanism of Multi Level Interest Distribution and Incentive Coordination in the Government Supervision of Engineering Quality

GUO Han-ding1,2, ZHANG Yin-xian1,2, TAO Kai1,2   

  1. 1. School of Economic & Management, Tianjin Chengjian University, Tianjin 300384, China;
    2. Research Center of Eco Livable City and Sustainable Construction Management, Tianjin Chengjian University, Tianjin 300384, China
  • Received:2017-06-20 Revised:2018-04-24 Online:2019-02-20 Published:2019-04-24

Abstract: The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.

Key words: engineering quality, government supervision, interest distribution function, game model, excitation mechanism, operation strategy

CLC Number: