Abstract: With the development of global economy, corporate social problems become more and more prominent. Managers and researchers have begun to explore how to effectively encourage enterprises to undertake more corporate social responsibility and promote sustainable development, which has become a growing concern. In this paper, the decision problem of decentralized supply chain with government subsidy and corporate social responsibility under random demand is studied. Based on the game analysis model, a secondary supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer is established. The influence of government subsidies on the optimal production and social responsibility input decision of supply chain is dicussed, and the supply chain efficiency under the leadership of suppliers and retailers is compared. The results show that in the centralized supply chain, the effect of price elasticity on the quantity of procurement and the total input of CSR is more prominent. When the government subsidy factor is added to the decentralized supply chain, the total income shows the trend of inverted U shape, and the retail dominated decentralized supply chain shows a rapid decline trend. And in the cost of corporate social responsibility input, increase government subsidies, in the supplier-led decentralized supply chain will enable suppliers to reduce the corporate social responsibility investment in unit products, But it has little impact on the retailers-led decentralized supply chain. By considering the optimal decision of the leader of the supply chain who considers the government subsidy in the decentralized supply chain to invest in the corporate social responsibility, the motivation of the enterprise is put forward to invest in CSR and the necessity and the optimal amount of the government subsidy. At the same time, it provides the foundation for the research on the coordination and sharing of corporate social responsibility input.

Key words: corporate social responsibility, government subsidies, random requirements