Abstract: In the venture capital, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs both improve the enterprise's profit ability, but comprehensive existing literature, it is argued that studying how to motivate the entrepreneur pay human capital and effort is more important. In order to study how to motivate the entrepreneurs to improve enterprise’s intrinsic value, in this paper entrepreneurs’ effort is divided into entrepreneurial effort and managerial effort. Firstly, the optimal financial contract is designed in the static single-period model, and the effect of two kinds of efforts efficiency on the incentive effect is analyzed. Studies have shown that,incenting entrepreneurs to pay the entrepreneurial effort is more complex than managerial effort, and related to the volatility of the quality of enterprises. Furthermore, venture capitalists’ learning process of enterprise information is added into the dynamic multi-periods model. On the basis of considering the two efforts of entrepreneurs, the influence of learning mechanism on the incentive efficiency is explored in this model. The research shows that in this process, the volatility of the quality of enterprises decreases monotonously, and the incentive effect of contracts becomes more and more significant. Finally, based on the existing literature, parameter values are set and the actual salary level of entrepreneurs is studied with the numerical method. Studies have shown that the addition of learning mechanism will encourage entrepreneurs to reduce the cost coefficient of efforts and improve their entrepreneurial effort efficiency. The research of this paper gives guidance to the individual development direction of entrepreneurs and provides new ideas and theories for improving the governance efficiency of venture capital enterprises.

Key words: entrepreneurial effort; managerial effort; static single-period model; Bayes Learning; dynamic multi-periods model