航运供应链上的品牌价值、公平关切与契约协调

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.01.008

Abstract

Abstract: The shipping volume fluctuation of international trade makes the competition among the shipping line companies become more and more fierce. On the shipping supply chain the shipping line companies usuallyneed to pay huge investment cost to improve the brand value for keeping the market share, which will lead to their ‘fairness concern’ on the return of brand investment. When shipping line companiesmake decision concerning fairness, not based on complete rationality,it will affect the benefit and efficiency of the whole shipping supply chain. In this paper, the theory of behavioral economics is applied to analyze the effect on the decision making of parties on the shipping supply chain with the shipping line companies' ‘fairness concern’.
This paperstudies the two level shipping supply chain composed of single shipping company and single freight forwarder. It sets up game theory models under three decision-making situationsincluding the centralized decision-making, the decentralized under complete rationality, and the decentralized under the fair concern, and calculate and compare the equilibrium strategy of all parties in the shipping supply chain in the three different situations. The influence of the fairness concern behavior of the shipping company on the operation decision of all parties on the shipping supply chain is discussed. Finally, the cooperation mode and coordination mechanism of the shipping supply chain with the shipping line companies concerning fairness are analyzed.
The results show that:1) the fair concern of shipping line company improves its profit share ratio on the shipping supply chain, but reduces the profit and efficiency of the whole shipping supply chain; 2) with the increase of investment intention, the negative impact of the fairness concerns of shipping company is more obvious on the decisions and profits of the shipping supply chain; 3) Revenue sharing cost sharing contract can eliminate the negative effect offair concern and optimize the income and efficiency of all parties on the shipping supply chain.

Key words: shipping supply chain, brand value, fairness concerns, brand investment intention, revenue sharing cost sharing

CLC Number:

F272

JIANG Bao, LI Qiu-shi, LI Jian. Brand Value, Fairness Concern and Contract Coordination on the Shipping Supply Chain[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(1): 101-112.

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Brand Value, Fairness Concern and Contract Coordination on the Shipping Supply Chain

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