Abstract: Carbon emission abatement behavior of each firm is long term and current decisions can affect the future status. Hence, in this paper, a supply chain including one supplier and one manufacturer is studied and the differential game model under two cases including decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making is established to study the dynamic optimization problem. In this model, consumers' low-carbon preference and carbon trading policy are considered. The optimal equilibrium feedback strategy, the optimal trajectory of emission reduction and the optimal profit of supply chain system of the two scenarios are compared and carbon emission abatement strategies are proposed. It is found the supplier's emission reduction, manufacturer's emission reduction, and supply chain system profit in the centralized decision-making are higher than the corresponding values in the decentralized decision-making, achieving supply chain coordination under the certain condition. The validity of the proposition is further verified by numerical simulation. Through the sensitivity analysis of low carbon preference and carbon trading price, it is found that with the increase of low carbon preference, the emission reduction of supplier, the emission reduction of manufacturer and the profit of supply chain system increase, and the government should adjust the carbon trading policy in time in the planning period to achieve the effect of encouraging the enterprises to reduce the emission.

Key words: low carbon preference, carbon trading policy, supply chain coordination, differential game