主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (9): 10-22.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.0912

• Articles • Previous Articles    

Research on Channel Competition Strategy of Financial Recommendation Service

YANG Mei1, WANG Zong-run2   

  1. 1. School of Finance, Hunan University of Technology and Business, Changsha 410205, China;2. School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
  • Received:2020-05-19 Revised:2020-08-11 Published:2022-08-31
  • Contact: 杨梅 E-mail:baiyanghanmei@163.com

Abstract: Due to the limited cognitive ability of investors in financial products, they mainly rely on external “value signals” to form their “aspirations” of earnings expectations to simplify the investment process.Thus, financial recommendation service competition is the inevitable result when digital platforms have successfully expanded their business to areas traditionally covered by banks. In this study, a new three-party dual-channel game model is considered where the platform steers investors by recommending firms taking into account both the commissions firms offer and the prices they set,and the bankmakes use of investors’ perception of value and rivals’ characteristics to take advantage of customers’ misunderstanding of “aspirations” by adjusting the sales intensity of financial advisors θ. It is assumed that the naive investors will inspect only the product ranked first by the intermediary, while sophisticated investors will find the financial product with the largest expected revenue on the platform through sequential searches. Based on revenue maximization, all investors decide whether to buy products in either the bank or the platform. Finally, according to the equilibrium solution and numerical analysis, the research shows that the effective allocation of financial service intensity enhances the competitiveness of banks, but the investor surplus is often completely deprived. Interestingly, in the competition with the platform, the bank has added additional motivation to provide financial knowledge literacy, and may prefer a strong rather than a weak enemy. In addition, the bank should attempt to control the cost of services to avoid the risk of regulators blocking the sale of financial products to prevent malicious competition. The model in this paper further confirms that the investors’ perceived value plays a very important role in regulating the bank’s marketing investment and provides various feasible suggestions for the bank looking to implement precision marketing based on data analysis.

Key words: financial service intensity; perceived aspirations; channel competition; investment decision; game model

CLC Number: