中小企业信用再担保体系演化稳定条件分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.07.001

Abstract

Abstract: In countries with stable small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) credit re-guarantee system, SMEs credit guarantee companies are required to join the re-guarantee system, and every SMEs credit guarantee agreement is automatically guaranteed by re-guarantee company. However, SMEs credit re-guarantee system is not mandatory in China. An important question is what conditions shall be matched in order to form a stable SMEs credit re-guarantee system through market mechanism rather than compulsory means. To answer the question, an evolutionary game model between SMEs credit guarantee companies and re-guarantee companies was developed to explore the evolutionary stability conditions for SMEs credit re-guarantee system. The evolutionary stable strategies and corresponding conditions of the system were found by utilizing the stability theory of differential equations. Under the premise of steady development of the system, adjustable ranges of operating mechanisms in the re-guarantee system, such as risk sharing proportion, re-guarantee rate and minimum government subsidy, were also further discussed quantitatively. Lastly, a numerical example was provided to verify and applicate the conclusions. The results show that the stable development of SMEs credit re-guarantee system needs two conditions:the incremental payoff of re-guarantee companies has to be positive, and the incremental payoff of guarantee companies has to exceed the filing costs after SMEs credit guarantee companies joining in the SMEs credit re-guarantee system. The results also show that the compensation rate has significant influences on the operating mechanisms in the re-guarantee system. The greater the compensation rate, the lesser the adjustable range of risk sharing proportion and re-guarantee rate. Moderate government subsidy is needed if the adjustable range of risk sharing proportion and re-guarantee rate is absent. The research results provide theoretical references that can be used to improve China's SMEs credit re-guarantee system.

Key words: SMEs credit re-guarantee system, evolutionary stability conditions, adjustable arranges

CLC Number:

F830

WANG Hui, DENG Xiao-mei, YANG Wei-hua, FENG Ke. Analysis on Evolutionary Stability Conditions for SMEs Credit Re-guarantee System[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(7): 1-10.

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Analysis on Evolutionary Stability Conditions for SMEs Credit Re-guarantee System

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