Abstract: Chemical industry is the important basic industry of national economy, however production safety management is in grim situation because of the particularity of its production. Owing to the disadvantage of safety production management mechanism in traditional chemical enterprises, the chemical enterprise safety production management mechanism research model is built, which is based on Stackelberg game model, to study the dynamic game analysis between government and chemical enterprises. In the paper, safety production management mechanism determined by government, production and security costs decided by chemical enterprise are analyzed. Moreover, according to a research on optimal reaction function of both government and chemical enterprise, a new model is constructed to study safety production management mechanism, based on economic benefit and security benefit of two players, with a series of parameters, which are composed of inspect probability. Then research results are as followed. Safety production management cost decided by chemical enterprise increases with the increase of variable cost per unit of production, inspect probability, average loss and fine. Fine determined by government decreases with the increase of fine, average loss and inspect probability. The minimum ratio of safe cost and production cost in chemical enterprise is positively correlated with the maximum investment funds, yet negatively correlated with the safety accident damage limit. It is found that simulation results are consistent with study, according to the numerical simulation of game model. The conclusion of this paper can be regarded as a reference to improve the rationality and effectiveness of enterprise safety production management mechanism.

Key words: safety production management, Stackelberg game, security costs, security gains and losses