Abstract: Internet-based online recyclers are a useful complement to existing e-waste recycling systems. Considering the differences in the collection cost of dual-channel and remanufacturable ratio of recycling products, the Stackelberg pricing model of manufacturer, retailer and online recycler is established. In this paper, the optimal collection price and profits of dual channel are determined separately under centralized and decentralized decision making. The impact of remanufacturable ratio of recycling products, collection competition coefficient, the consumer sensitivity of collection price and other factors on the collection prices, quantities and profits through numerical simulation is also analysed. Finally, the benefit cost sharing model is used to coordinate the subjects of the supply chain, and numerical examples are used to verify the efficiency of the coordination contract. The results show that:The profit of the whole closed-loop supply chain under the centralized decision making is the largest, whereas double marginalization results in loss of efficiency under decentralized decision making. Remanufacturable ratio of recycling products, collection competition coefficient, the consumer sensitivity of collection price are related to the collection amount of discarded product and profits of supply chain. To design a benefit cost sharing coordination contract can effectively improve the efficiency of closed-loop supply chain and increase profits of each party, and encourage manufacturer, retailer and online recycler to implement the contract.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, dual-channel recycling, Stackelberg game, remanufacturable ratio, revenue-cost sharing contract