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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2015, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (6): 91-98.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.201.06.012

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Dual Channel Pricing Strategy under Retailer Stackelberg Leadership

LIU Han-jin1, FAN Xiao-jun2, CHEN Hong-min3   

  1. 1. School of Marketing & Logistics, Nanjing University of Finance & Economics, Jiangsu 210046, China;
    2. School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 2004444, China;
    3. School of Antea Economics & Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200052, China
  • Received:2013-07-05 Revised:2014-04-15 Online:2015-06-20 Published:2015-07-22

Abstract: Aiming at the channel structure of retailer Stackelberg leadership, the channel effect when one manufacturer introduce direct online channel is discussed in this paper based on the consideration of both the different channel efficiencies and the product online acceptation degree of customer. Some results are showed that when the distribution efficiency of online channel is lower than the distribution efficiency of traditional channel enough, the sales in traditional channel will increase after the introduction of online channel. If the pricing strategy of fixed wholesale price is adopted, when the product online acceptation degree of customer is low and the distribution efficiency of online channel is lower than the distribution efficiency of traditional channel, the introduction of online channel is beneficial to the manufacturer, the retailer and the channel. Then, the introduction will be successful to the manufacturer. Under other conditions, the introduction of online channel is beneficial to the manufacturer and the channel, but disadvantageous to the retailer. As a result, the channel collision will appear.

Key words: retailer stackelberg leadership, direct online channel, pricing strategy, channel effect

CLC Number: