主管：中国科学院
主办：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2009, Vol. 17 ›› Issue (4): 97-102.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

交通BOT项目特许经营权竞标机制设计

严培胜, 王先甲   

  1. 武汉大学经济与管理学院系统工程研究所, 湖北武汉430072
  • 收稿日期:2008-12-22 修回日期:2009-07-01 出版日期:2009-08-30 发布日期:2009-08-30
  • 作者简介:严培胜(1975- ),男(汉族),湖北鄂州人,武汉大学科学研究所,博士生,研究方向:拍卖理论、系统优化与管理决策研究.
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金资助项目(60574071)

The Mechanism Design for Franchise Bidding in Traffic BOT Project

YAN Pei-sheng, WANG Xian-jia   

  1. School of Econimics and Managemenet, Institute of Systems Engineerng, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
  • Received:2008-12-22 Revised:2009-07-01 Online:2009-08-30 Published:2009-08-30

PDF (PC)

862

被引次数

11

摘要： 本文从项目拍卖者的角度,对交通BOT项目进行特许经营权机制设计,设计了一套科学合理的竞标机制来提高项目拍卖者对特许经营权的配置效率。我们运用激励机制设计思想建立了竞标机制模型,在保证竞标企业参与投标和真实显示自己的经营能力的条件下最大化期望社会福利,通过求解此模型得到了最优的竞标机制;鉴于最优机制在形式上的复杂性,我们给出了得分规则拍卖和供应契约拍卖两种最优拍卖方式。

关键词: BOT, 特许经营权, 多属性拍卖, 激励机制

Abstract: A franchise bidding mechanism is designed for traffic BOT project from the view of the regulator.The main purpose of this paper is to design a set of bidding mechanism scientifically and reasonably to improve the allocative efficiency of franchise bidding. The model of bidding is established based on the incentive mechanism,which is to maximize the expected social welfare on the condition of participation and truly displaying the managing ability of the companies. Then,the optimal biding mechanism is obtained by solving the model. Furthermore,we implement the optimal out come by first score sealed bid and supply contract auction.

Key words: BOT, franchise bidding, multi attribute auction, incentive mechanism

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