成本控制与棘轮效应：节约分成激励vs.目标分成激励

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.1570

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

国企总部授权生产单元进行成本控制，预期到上期绩效可能成为下期成本预算的参考，高能力管理者有动机在当期付出低努力、假扮低能力管理者，隐藏真实效率，实现高成本，棘轮效应出现。考察并比较两个激励机制，即节约分成（成本实际数低于预算数的分成）和目标分成（实现成本降低目标后的节约分成）对这一效应的作用。动态、逆向选择的委托代理关系下，委托人承诺长期特定激励机制（有着固定结构和变动参数），但不承诺任何跨期激励方案（有着固定结构和固定参数），棘轮效应出现，且随激励机制不同而变化。研究表明，在一个完美贝叶斯均衡中，相比节约分成激励机制，目标分成激励机制更能弱化棘轮效应。

关键词: 成本控制, 棘轮效应, 节约分成激励机制, 目标分成激励机制

Abstract:

In response to the impact of Novel coronavirus pneumonia， China State Shipbuilding Corporation Limited is implementing Cost Engineering Project regarded as a life project concerning the future destiny of the group. China State Shipbuilding Corporation Limited is trying its best to reduce the cost and expenses of shipbuilding. Our universtiy has a long history with the group and used to belong to it. Being separated， both sides still have closely strategic cooperation. Therefore， we are deeply involved in this project lasted for one year. During the course of cooperation， it seems that there was a serious asymmetry about shipbuilding cost information between group and shipyards.Headquarters of state-owned enterprise （principal） authorizes production unit （agent） to proceed cost control. It is reasonable to anticipate that the performance of cost control in previous period might become the reference of next budget cost. Agent with high ability is inclined to make low effort so as to conceal real efficiency， high cost followed in current period， which is ratchet effect.The impact of two kinds of incentive mechanism is examined and compared， i.e.， saving sharing of cost reduction （realized number of cost is lower than budget） and target sharing （share after completion of cost reduction target）， on the ratchet effect. In a principal-agent relationship with dynamic and adverse selection， the principal commits a long-term specific incentive mechanism （with fixed structure and variable parameters）， but doesn't commit intertemporal incentive scheme （with fixed structure and fixed parameters）. Then the ratchet effect occurs but varies with the different incentive mechanism. Game theory is employed to explore the analysis framework of principal-agent based on the theory of information asymmetry. This study shows target sharing incentive mechanism （TIM） could weaken ratchet effect efficiently compared with saving sharing incentive mechanism （SIM） in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

Key words: cost control, ratchet effect, sharing saving incentive mechanism（SIM）, target incentive mechanism（TIM）

中图分类号:

F275

崔健波,罗正英. 成本控制与棘轮效应：节约分成激励vs.目标分成激励[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(8): 90-99.

Jian-bo CUI,Zheng-ying LUO. Cost Control and Ratchet Effect: Sharing Saving Incentive Mechanism vs. Target Incentive Mechanism[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(8): 90-99.

图/表 4

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