关键词: 政府治理；动态惩罚机制；动态激励机制；演化博弈

Abstract: There are interactive and adaptive evolutionary courses between the e-commerce platform and consumers. Usually, the actions between e-commerce platform and consumers does not happen simultaneously. In this study, Stackelberg game model is built, where the self-discipline strategy adopted by e-commerce platform and the trust strategy adopted by consumers. In order to crack the credit “regulatory dilemma” of the e-commerce platform under incomplete information, the evolutionary game model under the dynamic penalty mechanism and incentive mechanism are constructed. Firstly, the replicator dynamic function can be described. Secondly, the influencing factors and evolution path of strategic choice between platform e-commerce and consumers are analyzed. Lastly, a numerical analysis is conducted to compare the implementation effect of the dynamic penalty mechanism and incentive mechanism. The results show that the evolutionary track of the e-commerce platform and the consumer through the long-term repeated game, portrays a stable equilibrium and spiral convergence. Specifically, the self-discipline strategy adopted by e-commerce platform when the government enhances the penalty intensity under the dynamic penalty mechanism and incentive mechanism. Moreover, the effect is the same between the penalty mechanism and the incentive mechanism when the government's punishment is smaller than the incentive policy. In addition, it has two-sides, that is, the evaluation of consumer reputation for the e-commerce platform, and the self-discipline strategy adopted by e-commerce platform when the evaluation of consumer reputation for platform e-commerce is higher. However, the non-self-discipline strategy adopted by e-commerce platform when the evaluation of consumer reputation for the e-commerce platform is lower. This research has important research significance and application worthy for the governance of trading on the platform, and it also provides a reference for e-commerce and sellers on the e-commerce platforms.

Key words: government regulation; dynamic penalty mechanism; dynamic incentive mechanism; evolutionary game