采用监督信号的供应链内部知识转移激励机制

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.09.011

中国管理科学 ›› 2020, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (9): 106-114.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.09.011

采用监督信号的供应链内部知识转移激励机制

李治^1,2, 孙锐², 王伟², 袁圆²

1. 湖南机电职业技术学院, 湖南长沙 410151;
2. 华侨大学工商管理学院, 福建泉州 362021

收稿日期:2018-02-03 修回日期:2019-03-13 出版日期:2020-09-20 发布日期:2020-09-25
通讯作者: 孙锐(1970-),男(汉族),山东蓬莱人,华侨大学工商管理学院,院长,教授,博士生导师,研究方向:信息管理与知识管理、企业创新管理,E-mail:sunrui@hqu.edu.cn E-mail:sunrui@hqu.edu.cn
基金资助:
教育部人文社科规划基金项目（20YJA630054）；国家自然科学基金资助项目（71601082）

The Internal Knowledge Transfer Incentive Mechanism of Supply Chain with Supervisory Signal

LI Zhi^1,2, SUN Rui², WANG Wei², YUAN Yuan²

1. Hunan Mechanical and Electrical Polytechnic, Changsha 410151, China;
2. School of business administration, Huaqiao University, Quanzhou 362021, China

Received:2018-02-03 Revised:2019-03-13 Online:2020-09-20 Published:2020-09-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 目前，一些与激励机制有关的研究开始在供应链内部知识转移中展开，但通常仅考虑对知识供给方的激励而忽略了对知识供给方的监督，致使激励效果受到限制。为解决此问题，采用数学建模与计算机仿真分析方法，通过引入监督信号，在供应链内部成员间知识转移基本激励模型的基础上，分别建立供应链上下级和同级成员间知识转移激励模型。研究发现，采用监督信号后，无论是上下级还是同级成员之间，供应链内部知识转移的收益水平和转移效率均得到了提升，但相比同级成员，供应链上下级成员间知识转移的收益水平和转移效率更高，收益更大。研究成果能为供应链企业有效开展知识转移活动和提升供应链竞争能力提供实践指导。

关键词: 供应链内部, 知识转移, 激励机制, 监督信号

Abstract: At present, some research on incentive mechanism has started in the knowledge transfer within supply chain, but usually only considering the incentive to the knowledge supplier and ignoring the supervision to the knowledge supplier, which limits the incentive effect. In order to solve this problem, the mathematical modeling and computer simulation analysis methods are used. By introducing the supervisory signal, the knowledge transfer incentive models among the members of the supply chain are established on the basis of the basic incentive models of knowledge transfer among the members of the supply chain. It is found that the income level and transfer efficiency of knowledge transfer within the supply chain have been improved by using supervisory signals, but the income level and transfer efficiency of knowledge transfer between the upper and lower members of the supply chain are higher and more profitable than those of the same level members. The research results can provide practical guidance for supply chain enterprises to effectively carry out knowledge transfer activities and enhance the competitiveness of supply chain.

Key words: internal supply chain, knowledge transfer, incentive mechanism, supervision signal

中图分类号:

F279

李治, 孙锐, 王伟, 袁圆. 采用监督信号的供应链内部知识转移激励机制[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(9): 106-114.

LI Zhi, SUN Rui, WANG Wei, YUAN Yuan. The Internal Knowledge Transfer Incentive Mechanism of Supply Chain with Supervisory Signal[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(9): 106-114.

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采用监督信号的供应链内部知识转移激励机制

The Internal Knowledge Transfer Incentive Mechanism of Supply Chain with Supervisory Signal

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