具有网络外部性特征的企业兼并模式选择

中国管理科学 ›› 2006, Vol. ›› Issue (5): 121-127.

具有网络外部性特征的企业兼并模式选择

程贵孙, 陈宏民, 孙武军

上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院, 上海, 200052

收稿日期:2005-12-12 修回日期:2006-09-21 出版日期:2006-10-28 发布日期:2012-03-07
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372057);中国博士后基金资助项目(2004036100)

The Mode Decision on Merger of Firms with the Characteristic of Network Externality

CHENG Gui-sun, CHEN Hong-min, SUN Wu-jun

The Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200052, China

Received:2005-12-12 Revised:2006-09-21 Online:2006-10-28 Published:2012-03-07

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在上游垄断、下游双寡头竞争和上下游均为双寡头竞争的两种市场结构下,基于网络外部性建立了标的企业兼并模式选择模型,分析了被兼并的标的企业以横向兼并和纵向兼并为选择的对策均衡.结论表明,在上游垄断、下游双寡头竞争的市场结构下标的企业兼并模式的选择不受网络外部性的影响,而在上下游均为双寡头竞争的市场结构下网络外部性的强度会影响到标的企业兼并模式的选择.最后,在福利分析的基础上也表明了政府与标的企业在兼并模式选择上存在着直接的利益冲突.

关键词: 网络外部性, 横向兼并, 纵向兼并, 社会福利

Abstract: The paper builds the merger models for the industrial structures of upstream duopoly with downstream oligopoly and upstream and downstream oligopoly with the characteristic of network externality respectively,and studies the game equilibrium when the firms take the horizontal and vertical merging as the strategy variables.The conclusions show the mode decisions have not been affected by the degree of network externality under the industrial structure of upstream duopoly with downstream oligopoly,but affected by the degree of network under the industrial structure of upstream and downstream duopoly.Furthermore,the paper shows the conflicts of interest between the firms and the government in the merger mode decision.

Key words: network externality, horizontal merger, vertical merger, social welfare

中图分类号:

F272

程贵孙, 陈宏民, 孙武军. 具有网络外部性特征的企业兼并模式选择[J]. 中国管理科学, 2006, (5): 121-127.

CHENG Gui-sun, CHEN Hong-min, SUN Wu-jun. The Mode Decision on Merger of Firms with the Characteristic of Network Externality[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2006, (5): 121-127.

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