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中国管理科学 ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (2): 75-86.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1420

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基于网络外部性的社区团购供应链营销策略研究

李秋香1,2,张静2,黄毅敏3(),齐二石4   

  1. 1.河南大学管理科学与工程研究所, 河南 开封 475004
    2.河南大学商学院, 河南 开封 475004
    3.华北水利水电大学管理与经济学院, 河南 郑州 450046
    4.天津大学经济与管理学部, 天津 300072
  • 收稿日期:2021-07-19 修回日期:2022-03-17 出版日期:2024-02-25 发布日期:2024-03-06
  • 通讯作者: 黄毅敏 E-mail:huang800526@163.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目(22BJY225)

Research on the Marketing Strategy of Community Group Buying Supply Chain Based on Network Externality

Qiuxiang Li1,2,Jing Zhang2,Yimin Huang3(),Ershi Qi4   

  1. 1.Institute of Management Science and Engineering,Henan University,Kaifeng 475004,China
    2.Business School of Henan University,Kaifeng 475004,China
    3.School of Economics and Management,North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power,Zhengzhou 450046,China
    4.Department of Economics and Management,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China
  • Received:2021-07-19 Revised:2022-03-17 Online:2024-02-25 Published:2024-03-06
  • Contact: Yimin Huang E-mail:huang800526@163.com

摘要:

本文对社区团购供应链的网络外部性与营销策略进行了研究,根据社区团购产品的网络外部性与营销努力承担的主体不同,构建了6种营销决策模型,探讨了网络外部性、努力水平对产品需求、定价以及平台和团长收益的影响,分析了平台和团长在6种营销方式下的最优营销策略选择问题。研究发现:(1)不同营销方式下,网络外部性与平台和团长的产品需求、定价和利润在一定范围内呈正相关,超出一定范围时,团长或平台会存在搭便车行为。(2)在无网络外部性因素下,当平台的营销努力水平较低时,平台和团长的收益在团长单独营销时最高;当平台的营销努力水平较高时,平台和团长的收益在平台单独营销时最高。(3)存在网络外部性时,当平台的营销努力水平较低时,平台的收益在团长单独营销时最高,而团长的收益在平台和团长同时营销时更高;当平台的营销努力水平较高时,平台和团长的收益在平台单独营销时最高。

关键词: 社区团购, 营销努力, 网络外部性, 营销策略

Abstract:

The network externalities and marketing strategies of the community group buying supply chain are studied. Based on the network externalities of community group buying products and the different entities responsible for marketing efforts, six marketing decision models are constructed to explore the effects of network externalities and effort levels on product demand, pricing, and platform and team leader returns. The optimal marketing strategy selection problem for the platform and team leader under six marketing methods is analyzed. It is found that: (1) Under different marketing methods, network externalities are positively correlated with product demand, pricing, and profits of platforms and team leaders within a certain range. Beyond a certain range, team leaders or platforms may engage in free riding behavior. (2) In the absence of network externalities, when the marketing efforts of the platform are low, the profits of the platform and the team leader are highest when the team leader separately markets. When the marketing efforts of the platform are high, the revenue of the platform and team leader is highest when the platform is separately marketed. (3) When there is network externality, when the platform's marketing efforts are low, the platform's revenue is highest when the team leader is marketing alone, and the team leader's revenue is higher when the platform and team leader are marketing simultaneously. When the marketing efforts of the platform are high, the revenue of the platform and team leader is highest when the platform is separately marketed.The impact of network externalities on the selection of community group buying platforms and marketing efforts by group leaders in the community group buying supply chain is studied. Based on the different entities that bear marketing costs, different marketing decision-making models without and with network externalities are constructed, and the optimal marketing strategies under different marketing efforts are analyzed; And combined with numerical analysis, the relationship between different decision models is compared, and corresponding management insights are provided. It is found that: (1) under the independent marketing approach of the platform, network externalities are positively correlated with the platform's marketing efforts, platform pricing, product demand, and the revenue of the platform and team leaders within a certain range. Beyond this range, team leaders may engage in free riding behavior. (2) In the case of individual marketing by team leaders, network externalities are positively correlated with marketing efforts, platform pricing, product demand, and the revenue of both the platform and team leaders within a certain range. Beyond this range, the platform may engage in free riding behavior. (3) In the case of simultaneous marketing by team leaders and platforms, network externalities are positively correlated with their marketing efforts, platform pricing, and product demand. However, network externalities are positively correlated with the platform and team leader's revenue within a certain range. Beyond a certain range, the platform or team leader may engage in free riding behavior. (4) The choice of platform and team leader marketing models depends on the level of marketing efforts of both when there is or is no network externality.For the platform, the team leader is closest to consumers and has more advantages in marketing. The platform can take appropriate incentive measures to increase product sales and obtain higher profits. Secondly, it makes reasonable use of the network externalities of community group buying products, establishes reasonable sales prices, and effectively reduces problems such as low price dumping and vicious competition on community group buying platforms in this study. For team leaders, they should make reasonable use of their own advantages for marketing efforts, not just rely on community group buying platforms, but take the initiative to obtain higher profits and achieve mutual benefit and win-win between community group buying platforms and team leaders.

Key words: community group buying, marketing effort, network externality, marketing strategy

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