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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (7): 153-161.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0167

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

扶贫领域中权力寻租行为的政府监督策略与晋升机制研究

高雨薇1, 聂腾飞2, 杜少甫1   

  1. 1.中国科学技术大学管理学院，安徽 合肥230026；2.山东大学管理学院，山东 济南250100
  • 收稿日期:2021-01-23 修回日期:2021-05-25 出版日期:2023-07-17 发布日期:2023-07-17
  • 通讯作者: 聂腾飞(1986-)，男(汉族)，安徽安庆人，山东大学管理学院，教授，博士生导师，博士，研究方向：行为运作、博弈论，Email:ntf198602@sdu.edu.cn. E-mail:ntf198602@sdu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71971201，72071193，71631006)

Research on Government Monitoring Strategy and Promotion Mechanism of Power Rent-seeking in Poverty Alleviation

GAO Yu-wei1, NIE Teng-fei2, DU Shao-fu1   

  1. 1.School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China;2.School of Management, Shandong University, Jinan 250100, China
  • Received:2021-01-23 Revised:2021-05-25 Online:2023-07-17 Published:2023-07-17
  • Contact: 聂腾飞 E-mail:ntf198602@sdu.edu.cn

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摘要： 扶贫领域中的权力寻租问题不仅会给国家财政资金造成巨大的损失，也会影响政府在公众心目中的公信力，因此该问题是一个值得关注和研究的重要议题。本文考虑村干部获取扶贫资金后分配给村民时可能存在寻租空间和监督疏漏，而政府会监督村干部以防其攫取私利，当村干部拥有关于其自身类型(寻租或不寻租)和关于村民的真实情况(真贫困户或假贫困户)的二维私人信息时，通过建立一个博弈模型来研究村民向村干部提供租金的策略、村干部的权力寻租概率以及政府效用。研究结果表明，村民的竞租策略会影响村干部的寻租概率，随着政府监督力度的加强，村民提供较高的租金仍会导致村干部寻租概率上升；而当配以本文提出的评分晋升机制后，即使村民提供较高的租金也会有效降低村干部的寻租概率。除此之外，本文还为政府应该如何设定最优监督力度提供了一些有效建议。

关键词: 扶贫；权力寻租；不完全信息；监督

Abstract: Power rent-seeking in the field of poverty alleviation not only causes huge losses to the national financial funds, but also affects the credibility of the government in the eyes of the public. Therefore, it is an important topic worthy of attention and research. In this paper, a setting is considered in which a village cadre obtains poverty alleviation funds and distribute them to poor villager. The government will monitor to prevent the village cadre from being bribed to distribute poverty alleviation funds to fake poor or real poor. The village cadre has two-dimensional private information about his own type (rent or not rent) and about the villagers’ condition (real poor or fake poor). A game-theoretic model is developed to investigate the strategies of villagers’ rent competition, the probability of village cadre’s rent-seeking and the utility of the government. The results show that villagers’ rent-seeking strategies will affect the rent-seeking probability of village cadre. With the strengthening of monitoring, higher rent provided by villagers will still increase the rent-seeking probability of village cadre; After the rating promotion mechanism is proposed, even if the villagers provide higher rent, the rent-seeking behavior of the village cadre can be effectively reduced. In addition, some effective suggestions on how the government should set the optimal monitoring are provided.

Key words: poverty alleviation; power rent-seeking; incomplete information; monitoring

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