PPP项目再融资收益分配研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.2194

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

PPP项目进入运营期后，社会资本方可以通过再融资提高项目的回报率；但如果回报率过高，则会损害公众利益、影响项目物有所值、增加公共部门的风险，因此再融资收益应该在公私双方之间进行合理分配，但现有研究尚不能回答如何分配才能实现公私双赢、促进PPP可持续发展。本文从公私双赢的角度出发，考虑消费者剩余率、行业基准收益率和再融资后逐年剩余负债比例因素，构建了确定公私双方再融资收益分配比例的动态分配模型。研究结果表明，公共部门的再融资收益分配比例最大值与行业基准收益率呈负相关的关系，其最小值与行业平均消费者剩余率呈正相关的关系；公共部门的再融资收益分配比例与再融资后年债务剩余比例呈正相关关系。本文所构建的再融资收益动态分配模型可为PPP项目再融资收益在公私双方间的合理分配提供借鉴，促进PPP可持续发展。

关键词: PPP项目, 再融资, 收益分配

Abstract:

After the PPP project enters the operation period， the private sector can increase the return rate of the project through refinancing； however， if the return rate is too high， it will damage the public interest， affect the VFM of the project， and increase the risk of the public sector. Refinancing income should be reasonably distributed between public and private sectors， but existing research cannot answer how to distribute to achieve a public-private win-win situation and promote the sustainable development of PPP. From the perspective of public-private win-win， the factors of consumer surplus rate， industry benchmark rate of return and the proportion of remaining debts year after refinancing are considered， and constraints are established and a dynamic allocation model is constructed to determine the proportion of public and private refinancing income distribution.The research results show that the maximum value of the public sector refinancing income distribution ratio is negatively related to the industry benchmark rate of return， and its minimum value is positively related to the industry average consumer surplus rate； and the remaining proportion of annual debt after financing is positively correlated. A PPP expressway project case has been analyzed to demonstrated the validation of the model. The dynamic distribution model of refinancing income constructed in this paper can provide reference for the reasonable distribution of PPP project refinancing income between public and private， and promote the sustainable development of PPP.

Key words: PPP project, refinancing, income distribution

中图分类号:

F224

王秀芹,刘旸,王兵. PPP项目再融资收益分配研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(8): 51-60.

Xiu-qin WANG,Yang LIU,Bing WANG. Research on Income Distribution of PPP Project Refinancing[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(8): 51-60.

图/表 8

表1

模型符号与公式说明"

数量	B（初融资）	A（再融资）
营业收益	$R (t)$	$R (t)$
年份	$t$	$t$
成本	$O (t) = γ t + k$	$O (t) = γ t + k$
可变成本系数	$γ$	$γ$
固定成本	$k$	$k$
贷款额	$D$	$D t$
贷款年限	$T 1$	$T 2$ ， $T 1 < T 2$
贷款利率	$r 1$	$r 2, r 2 < r 1$
贷款利息	$I n t 1 = D × r 1$	$I n t 2 = D t × r 2$
所得税	$T a x 1 = E 1 × t a x$	$T a x 2 = E 2 × t a x$
纳税基数	$E 1 = R - O - I n t 1$	$E 2 = R - O - I n t 2$
还款年金（等额还本付息）	$Y 1 = D × r 1 1 + r 1 T 1 1 + r 1 T 1 - 1$	$Y 2 = D t × r 2 1 + r 2 T 2 1 + r 2 T 2 - 1$
年现金流	$C I - C O = R - O - T a x - Y$	$C I - C O = R - O - T a x - Y$

表1

表2

表3

再融资前收入、支出和净现值"

年份	日通行量	收入	运营成本	EBIT	还款本金	还款利息	实缴税	净利润	净现金流	净现值
1	—	-30000	—	—	—	—	—	—	-30000.00	-28301.89
2	—	-30000	—	—	—	—	—	—	-30000.00	-26699.89
3	—	-30000	—	—	—	—	—	—	-30000.00	-25188.58
4	14438	5270	700	4570	2750.73	4410.00	39.97	119.90	-2630.83	-2083.86
5	15282	5578	1000	4578	2885.51	4275.21	75.68	227.04	-2658.48	-1986.57
6	25876	9445	1300	8145	3026.90	4133.82	1002.73	3008.19	-18.72	-13.20
7	29228	10668	1600	9068	3175.22	3985.51	1270.68	3812.04	636.81	423.52
8	34323	12528	1900	10628	3330.81	3829.92	1699.49	5098.48	1767.67	1109.06
9	43987	16055	2200	13855	3494.02	3666.71	2547.14	7641.41	4147.39	2454.83
10	51564	18821	2500	16321	3665.22	3495.50	3206.34	9619.02	5953.79	3324.57
11	58619	21396	2800	18596	3844.82	3315.91	3820.01	11460.02	7615.20	4011.59
12	63493	23175	3100	20075	4033.22	3127.51	4236.86	12710.58	8677.36	4312.38
13	57813	21102	3400	17702	4230.87	2929.88	3692.97	11078.90	6848.05	3210.63
14	63792	23284	3700	19584	4438.15	2722.57	4215.38	12646.13	8207.97	3630.39
15	74534	27205	4000	23205	4655.62	2505.10	5174.95	15524.86	10869.23	4535.35
16	75013	27380	4300	23080	4883.75	2276.98	5200.69	15602.08	10718.32	4219.23
17	83772	30577	4600	25977	5123.05	2037.67	5984.79	17954.38	12831.32	4765.10
18	89107	32524	4900	27624	5374.08	1786.64	6459.34	19378.03	14003.95	4906.20
19	94442	34471	5200	29271	5637.41	1523.31	6936.97	20810.91	15173.49	5015.04
20	99776	36418	5500	30918	5913.65	1247.08	7417.82	22253.46	16339.81	5094.83
21	105111	38366	5800	32566	6203.42	957.31	7902.06	23706.17	17502.75	5148.53
22	110446	40313	6100	34213	6507.39	653.34	8389.84	25169.52	18662.14	5178.84
23	115780	42260	6400	35860	6826.25	334.48	8881.35	26644.05	19817.80	5188.25
24	121115	44207	6700	37507	0.00	0.00	9376.76	28130.29	28130.29	6947.58
25	126450	46154	7000	39154	0.00	0.00	9788.56	29365.67	29365.67	6842.16
26	131785	48101	7300	40801	0.00	0.00	10200.35	30601.05	30601.05	6726.42
27	137119	50049	7600	42449	0.00	0.00	10612.14	31836.42	31836.42	6601.85
28	142454	51996	7900	44096	0.00	0.00	11023.93	33071.80	33071.80	6469.84
29	147789	53943	8200	45743	0.00	0.00	11435.73	34307.18	34307.18	6331.62
30	153124	55890	8500	47390	0.00	0.00	11847.52	35542.56	35542.56	6188.32
总计	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	28362.13

表3

表4

表5

消费者剩余率计算"

年份	CS	$α = 66$ % PS	$α$ =66% $χ$ /%	$α = 16$ % PS	$α$ =16% $χ$ /%	年份	CS	$α = 66$ % PS	$α$ =66% $χ$ /%	$α = 16$ % PS	$α$ =16% $χ$ /%
1	—	—	—	—	—	16	27379.75	11407.65	70.59	12421.36	68.79
2	—	—	—	—	—	17	30576.85	13532.13	69.32	14562.72	67.74
3	—	—	—	—	—	18	32524.02	14716.92	68.85	15765.42	67.35
4	5269.87	-2630.83	199.69	-2630.83	199.69	19	34471.19	15899.38	68.44	16966.86	67.01
5	5577.93	-2658.48	191.06	-2658.48	191.06	20	36418.36	17079.38	68.07	18166.99	66.72
6	9444.74	586.85	94.15	1477.38	86.47	21	38365.54	18256.82	67.76	19365.75	66.46
7	10668.22	1248.64	89.52	2148.39	83.24	22	40312.71	19431.57	67.48	20563.09	66.22
8	12527.90	2386.17	84.00	3295.72	79.17	23	42259.88	20603.51	67.22	21758.96	66.01
9	16055.26	4772.97	77.08	5692.95	73.82	24	44207.05	23331.14	62.52	24099.00	64.72
10	18820.86	6586.92	74.08	7517.98	71.46	25	46154.22	24532.46	62.47	25305.78	64.59
11	21395.94	8256.34	72.16	9199.19	69.93	26	48101.39	25732.63	62.43	26511.57	64.47
12	23174.95	9327.01	71.30	10282.39	69.27	27	50048.57	26931.59	62.39	27716.37	64.36
13	21101.75	7506.75	73.76	8475.43	71.34	28	51995.74	28129.32	62.35	28920.12	64.26
14	23284.08	8876.28	72.40	9859.09	70.25	29	53942.91	34307.18	61.13	34307.18	61.13
15	27204.91	11547.73	70.20	12545.53	68.44	30	55890.08	35542.56	61.13	35542.56	61.13

表5

表6

图1

图2

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年份	还款年金	实缴税	净利润	净现金流	净现值	再融资收益	净现金流（α=66%）	净现值（α=66%）
1	—	—	—	-30000.00	-28301.89	—	—	-28301.89
2	—	—	—	-30000.00	-26699.89	—	—	-26699.89
3	—	—	—	-30000.00	-25188.58	—	—	-25188.58
4	7160.73	39.97	119.90	-2630.83	-2083.86	0.00	-2630.83	-2083.86
5	7160.73	75.68	227.04	-2658.48	-1986.57	0.00	-2658.48	-1986.57
6	5063.29	1319.09	3957.28	1762.36	1242.39	1781.08	586.85	413.70
7	5063.29	1568.62	4705.86	2436.31	1620.29	1799.50	1248.64	830.42
8	5063.29	1977.83	5933.49	3586.78	2250.39	1819.10	2386.17	1497.11
9	5063.29	2804.62	8413.85	5987.35	3543.90	1839.96	4772.97	2825.12
10	5063.29	3441.64	10324.93	7815.93	4364.37	1862.14	6586.92	3678.10
11	5063.29	4031.74	12095.22	9500.91	5004.96	1885.71	8256.34	4349.34
12	5063.29	4423.54	13270.63	10588.11	5261.97	1910.76	9327.01	4635.24
13	5063.29	3853.04	11559.13	8785.41	4118.94	1937.36	7506.75	3519.46
14	5063.29	4347.20	13041.61	10173.59	4499.79	1965.61	8876.28	3925.99
15	5063.29	5276.79	15830.37	12864.83	5368.04	1995.60	11547.73	4818.47
16	5063.29	5270.71	15812.12	12745.75	5017.32	2027.43	11407.65	4490.58
17	5063.29	6021.05	18063.14	14892.51	5530.55	2061.19	13532.13	5025.35
18	5063.29	6459.79	19379.37	16100.94	5640.86	2097.00	14716.92	5155.98
19	5063.29	6899.45	20698.35	17308.45	5720.67	2134.96	15899.38	5254.95
20	5063.29	7340.06	22020.17	18515.02	5773.07	2175.21	17079.38	5325.43
21	5063.29	7781.64	23344.93	19720.60	5800.92	2217.85	18256.82	5370.34
22	5063.29	8224.24	24672.73	20925.18	5806.84	2263.04	19431.57	5392.36
23	5063.29	8667.89	26003.67	22128.70	5793.23	2310.90	20603.51	5393.94
24	5063.29	9112.62	27337.86	23331.14	5762.29	—	23331.14	5762.29
25	5063.29	9558.47	28675.41	24532.46	5716.03	—	24532.46	5716.03
26	5063.29	10005.48	30016.43	25732.63	5656.29	—	25732.63	5656.29
27	5063.29	10453.68	31361.05	26931.59	5584.75	—	26931.59	5584.75
28	5063.29	10903.13	32709.38	28129.32	5502.94	—	28129.32	5502.94
29	0.00	11435.73	34307.18	34307.18	6331.62	—	34307.18	6331.62
30	0.00	11847.52	35542.56	35542.56	6188.32	—	35542.56	6188.32
总计	—	—	—	—	38839.96	—	—	28383.33

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