信贷环境与类型差异情景下的PPP项目政府经济承诺决策

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.06.006

中国管理科学 ›› 2020, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (6): 63-72.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2020.06.006

信贷环境与类型差异情景下的PPP项目政府经济承诺决策

刘小峰¹, 王雪荣², 吴孝灵¹

1. 南京财经大学会计学院, 江苏南京 210023;
2. 南京审计大学工程管理与审计学院, 江苏南京 211815

收稿日期:2018-06-18 修回日期:2019-04-24 出版日期:2020-06-20 发布日期:2020-06-29
作者简介:王雪荣(1967-),女(汉族),安徽宿州人,南京审计大学工程管理与审计学院,教授,研究方向:项目管理与项目审计等,E-mail:wangxuerong4079@126.com.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71971107，71671080，71471082，71571099，71701090，71841025）；江苏省青蓝工程资助项目；江苏省公共工程审计重点实验室课题研究基金资助项目（GGSS2016-02）

Government Economic Commitment Decision-making under Difference Scenarios of Credit Environment and Revenue Type in PPP Projects

LIU Xiao-feng¹, WANG Xue-rong², WU Xiao-ling¹

1. School of Accounting, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics, Nanjing 210023, China;
2. School of Engineering Management and Auditing, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815, China

Received:2018-06-18 Revised:2019-04-24 Online:2020-06-20 Published:2020-06-29

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为破解政府在PPP项目中存在的"承诺不足"与"承诺过度"决策难题，基于项目类型和信贷环境差异构建四种决策情景，融合优化决策与实物期权理论构建政府经济承诺决策模型，通过Kuhn-Tucker条件分析模型解的条件与边界并设计计算机求解算法，以W市城东污水处理项目为例进行数值模拟探讨政府经济承诺决策规律。结果表明：情景差异将会影响政府经济承诺决策；政府经济承诺可以提升项目价值，但较高的经济承诺未必导致较高的承诺成本；政府应对收益波动型项目给予更低的经济承诺，应在信贷收紧时给予更高的经济承诺，反之亦然；政府可以通过转移收益分配权和增加投资额来降低经济承诺，且不同情景效果具有差异。本文系统刻画了信贷环境与类型差异对经济承诺决策的影响，对于明晰经济承诺的决策成本及其后果、控制PPP项目金融风险、优化我国政府经济承诺决策等具有积极价值。

关键词: PPP项目, 经济承诺, 可行性缺口补助, 情景建模

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to solve the problem of insufficient or excessive government economic commitment existing in Chinese PPP projects. First, four scenarios are constructed to describe differences between project types and credit environment. Secondary, a government economic commitment decision-making model is developed by combining the optimization decision with the real option theory. Then, besides analyzing the conditions and boundaries of the model solution, a computer solution algorithm is provided with no analytical solution based on sequential unconstrained minimization technique. Finally, the decision-making rules of the sewage treatment project in W city are explored by numerical simulation analysis method. The results show that scenario difference affects government's economic commitment decision, the government’s economic commitment will add the value of the project, but higher economic commitment does not necessarily lead to higher commitment costs. Government should give lower economic commitments for projects with greater yield fluctuations, but give higher economic commitments with tighter credit, and vice versa. The government can reduce its economic commitments by shifting income distribution rights or increasing capital investment. The influence rules of credit environment and type difference on economic commitment decision-making are revealed, which expands the research on government economic commitment decision-making. It is helpful for clarifying the decision-making cost and consequences of the government economic commitment, controlling project financial risks, and optimizing the economic commitment decision-making of Chinese PPP projects

Key words: PPP projects, economic commitment, viability gap funding, scenario modeling

中图分类号:

F294

刘小峰, 王雪荣, 吴孝灵. 信贷环境与类型差异情景下的PPP项目政府经济承诺决策[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(6): 63-72.

LIU Xiao-feng, WANG Xue-rong, WU Xiao-ling. Government Economic Commitment Decision-making under Difference Scenarios of Credit Environment and Revenue Type in PPP Projects[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(6): 63-72.

参考文献

[1] 季闯, 黄伟, 袁竞峰, 等. 基础设施PPP项目脆弱性评估方法[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2016, 36(3):613-622.
[2] 韦小泉, 谢娜, 程哲,等.中国PPP发展的驱动因素时空分异研究[J]. 财政科学, 2017, (2):85-97.
[3] Juan A R, Mario I C. Self-adaptive SOM-CNN neural system for dynamic object detection in normal and complex scenarios[J]. Pattern Recognition, 2015, 48(4):1133-1145.
[4] Eduardo M, Ronald D, Alexander G. Least present value of revenue auctions and highway franchising[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 2001, 109(5):993-1020.
[5] 宋锦. 高速公路PPP项目可行性缺口补助测算模型研究[J]. 工程经济, 2017, 27(11):57-60.
[6] Huang Yulin, Chou ShihPei. Valuation of the minimum revenue guarantee and the option to abandon in BOT infrastructure projects[J]. Construction Management & Economics, 2006, 24(4):379-389.
[7] Ashuri B, Kashani H, Molenaar K R, et al. Risk-neutral pricing approach for evaluating bot highway projects with government minimum revenue guarantee options[J]. Journal of Construction Engineering & Management, 2012, 138(4):545-557.
[8] Carbonara N, Costantino N, Pellegrino R. Revenue guarantee in public-private partnerships:A fair risk allocation model[J]. Construction Management & Economics, 2014, 32(4):403-415.
[9] Power G J, Burris M, Vadali S, et al. Valuation of strategic options in public-private partnerships[J]. Transportation Research Part A:Policy & Practice, 2016, (90):50-68.
[10] Takashima R, Yagi K, Takamori H. Government guarantees and risk sharing in public-private partnerships[J]. Review of Financial Economics, 2010, 19(2):78-83.
[11] Chiara N, Kokkaew N. Alternative to government revenue guarantees:The dynamic revenue insurance contracts[J]. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 2013, 19(3):287-296.
[12] Issouf S, Van S L. An analysis of government loan guarantees and direct investment through public-private partnerships[J]. Economic Modelling, 2016, (59):508-519.
[13] Wang Yinglin, Liu Jicai. Evaluation of the excess revenue sharing ratio in PPP projects using principal-agent models[J].International Journal of Project Management,2015,33(6):1317-1324.
[14] 王玺, 夏强. 政府与社会资本合作(PPP)财政承诺管理研究——以青岛地铁X号线PPP项目为例[J]. 财政研究, 2016,(9):64-75.
[15] Ana B A, Christine B, Javier R. Public private partnerships:Incentives, risk transfer and real options[J]. Review of Financial Economics, 2008, 16(4):335-349.
[16] 赵立力,卜祥智, 谭德庆. 基础设施BOT项目中的两种政府保证研究[J]. 系统工程学报, 2009, 24(2):190-197.
[17] 张禄, 石磊, 戴大双,等. PPP项目政府担保对项目效率影响研究[J]. 中国管理科学,2017, 25(8):89-96.
[18] Cai Ning, Song Yingda, Kou Steven. A general framework for pricing Asian options under Markov processes[J]. Operations Research, 2015, 63(3):540-554.
[19] Peter E, Dominic D, Zahir I. Cost overruns in transportation infrastructure projects:Sowing the seeds for a probabilistic theory of causation[J]. Transportation Research Part A:Policy & Practice, 2016, (92):184-194.
[20] 吴孝灵, 刘小峰, 周晶,等. 基于私人过度自信的PPP项目最优补偿契约设计与选择[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(11):29-39.
[21] Woon S F, Rehbock V, Loxton R C. Global optimization method for continuous-time sensor scheduling[J]. Nonlinear Dynamics & Systems Theory, 2010, 2(2):175-188.
[22] Mairal J, Bach F, Ponce J, et al. Online learning for matrix factorization and sparse coding[J]. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 2010, 11(1):19-60.

信贷环境与类型差异情景下的PPP项目政府经济承诺决策

Government Economic Commitment Decision-making under Difference Scenarios of Credit Environment and Revenue Type in PPP Projects

PDF (PC)

可视化

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 3

Metrics

本文评价

推荐阅读 10

[1]	高若兰, 周亦宁, 刘继才. 基于前景理论的PPP项目投资者逆向选择问题研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(1): 36-46.
[2]	梁秀峰, 张飞涟, 颜红艳. 基于演化博弈的PPP项目绩效支付机制仿真与优化[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(4): 153-163.
[3]	吴孝灵, 刘小峰, 周晶, 卢梦莹. 基于私人过度自信的PPP项目最优补偿契约设计与选择[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(11): 29-39.