考虑公平偏好的双重信息不对称下PPP项目激励机制研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0429

摘要/Abstract

摘要： PPP项目中社会资本的能力禀赋和努力水平为其私有信息，如何激励社会资本显示真实的能力禀赋和努力水平一直是PPP项目治理研究的重要议题。在传统的PPP项目激励治理研究中，往往假设社会资本只具有单一私有信息，由此形成单一的逆向选择或道德风险问题。但在PPP激励治理现实中，社会资本经常同时拥有关于能力禀赋和努力水平双重私有信息，从而导致关于类型不对称信息的逆向选择和关于行为不对称信息的道德风险问题共存。本文研究了PPP项目中逆向选择和道德风险共存的激励机制设计问题。构建了针对社会资本同时拥有能力禀赋和努力水平两种私有信息的激励机制设计模型。该模型以项目产出绩效为激励途径，通过设计最优契约使得社会资本谎报信息类型的收益水平不高于其真实汇报类型的收益，从而激励社会资本显示真实能力禀赋的同时付出最优努力水平，保证项目效率。同时考虑了社会资本的公平偏好，探讨了公平偏好对这种双重不对称信息激励机制设计的影响。研究表明：通过设计合理的PPP项目激励机制能够实现对社会资本的信息甄别和激励其付出最优努力的双重目的，政府对社会资本的激励强度同社会资本市场分布有关，且随着社会资本嫉妒偏好强度的提高和被指责偏好强度的减弱而增大。本文的研究可以为解决现实中PPP项目的激励机制设计问题提供理论依据和决策参考。

关键词: PPP项目, 逆向选择, 道德风险, 公平偏好

Abstract: The capability and effort level in PPP project are social capital’s private information. How to induce social capital to display real capability and effort level has been an important issue in the research of PPP project governance. In traditional research of incentive governance of PPP project, it is often assumed that social capital has only single private information, thus forming single adverse selection or moral hazard problems. However, in actual production of incentive governance of PPP project, social capital often has dual private information of his capability and effort level, leading to the coexistence of adverse selection with asymmetric information of type and moral hazard with asymmetric information of behavior. In this study, the incentive mechanism with coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard in PPP project is designed. The incentive mechanism model for social capital with private information of capability and effort level is constructed, which takes output performance as incentive approach. Through designing of the optimal contract, the gain of social capital by claiming false information is not greater than that of reporting his true information, so that social capital is driven to display real capability and exert optimal effort level, and project efficiency is ensured. Moreover, fair preference of social capital is considered, and the effect of fair preference on incentive mechanism design under dual asymmetric information is discussed. Results corroborate that through reasonable incentive mechanism design of PPP project, dual purposes of information screening and inducing effort of social capital can be realized. Incentive intensity of the government is related to market distribution of social capital. Moreover, it will increase with improvement of envy preference intensity and weakening of blamed preference intensity of social capital. The developed model and method can provide decision-making basis and reference for solving the problem of incentive mechanism of PPP project.

Key words: PPP project, adverse selection, moral hazard, fair preference

中图分类号:

F224
F284

王先甲，袁睢秋，林镇周,赵金华，秦颖. 考虑公平偏好的双重信息不对称下PPP项目激励机制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(10): 107-120.

WANG Xianjia, YUAN Suiqiu, LIN Zhenzhou, ZHAO Jinhua, QIN Ying. Research on Incentive Mechanism of PPP Project under Dual Information Asymmetry Based on Fair Preference[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(10): 107-120.

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