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主办：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2019, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (9): 205-216.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.09.020

• 论文 • 上一篇    

价值与风险感知对好评返现行为影响的演化分析

韩菁1,2, 蔡寻1, 滕新玉1   

  1. 1. 陕西师范大学国际商学院, 陕西 西安 710119;
    2. 西安交通大学管理学院, 陕西 西安 710049
  • 收稿日期:2018-08-22 修回日期:2019-04-23 出版日期:2019-09-20 发布日期:2019-09-29
  • 通讯作者: 蔡寻(1994-),男(汉族),四川内江人,陕西师范大学国际商学院硕士研究生,研究方向:博弈分析、社会网络分析,E-mail:caixunsnnu@126.com. E-mail:caixunsnnu@126.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目（71403158）；教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目（18XJA840002）；中国博士后科学基金资助项目（2016M590960）

The Evolutionary Analysis of the Influence of Value and Risk Perception on Cash Back for Favorable Comment

HAN Jing1,2, CAI Xun1, TENG Xin-yu1   

  1. 1. International Business School, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an 710119, China;
    2. School of Management, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, China
  • Received:2018-08-22 Revised:2019-04-23 Online:2019-09-20 Published:2019-09-29

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摘要： 为探究C2C平台在线评论中好评返现行为的演化机制，将前景理论和风险感知因素引入演化博弈过程，构建了有别于传统收益矩阵的收益感知矩阵，以更好地刻画奖惩机制设置下买家和商家行为决策的动态演化过程。从前景理论和风险感知的视角诠释最优演化结果难以实现的原因，通过仿真收益和价值感知等不同参数对演化结果的影响，有针对性的提出治理好评返现的措施。研究结果表明：决策者的认知偏差、乐观偏见、确定和反射效应将使系统难收敛于最优演化稳定点；提高决策者对"收益"和"损失"的价值感知及损失规避程度有助于系统演化至最优结果；当博弈双方的初始选择概率，买方的客观差评收益、道德成本、公共利益感知和卖方的好评返现运营成本、抢占市场收益等参数围绕阈值变动时能够改变策略的演化倾向和稳定性。

关键词: 前景理论, 在线评论, 好评返现, 价值感知, 演化博弈

Abstract: A large number of spam reviews have been encouraged by the cashback incentives for favorable comment on C2C platform, and the phenomenon has damaged the platform's credit evaluation mechanism. The dynamic evolution of the cash back for favorable comment not only stems from the interaction between the buyer and the seller on C2C platform, but also depends on their behavioral psychology. Therefore, the psychology theory is worth being introduced to explore the evolutionary mechanism of the cash back for favorable comment on C2C platform. In this paper, the prospect theory and risk perception factors are integrated into the evolutionary game analysis to build the perceived benefit matrix, which is different from the traditional benefit matrix. In this case, the dynamic evolutionary process of buyers' and sellers' behaviors can be better depicted under the setting of reward and punishment mechanism. From the perspectives of prospect theory and risk perception, the reasons why the stability conditions of optimal evolution results are difficult are illustrated to meet and the effects of evolutionary results caused by different parameters are simulated; therefore, the measures to manage the cash back for favorable comment are proposed. The result indicates:(1)Decision-maker's cognitive and optimistic bias and deterministic and reflective effect make it difficult for the system to converge to the optimal evolutionary stable point; (2)Improving decision-maker's perception of "gain" and "loss" and the loss aversion contributes to an evolutionary optimal result; (3)The evolutionary tendency and stability of the strategy can be changed when the following factors fluctuate around their critical point:the initial selection probability of both sides in the game, the earning of negative review, moral cost and public interest perception of buyers, the sellers' OPEX of cash back for favorable comment or not and the gain of contending for markets.In view of the cash back incentives for favorable comment, a theoretical analysis and quantitative research on the strategic interaction between the buyer and the seller on the C2C platform are conducted. This paper aims to provide theoretical support for relevant departments to manage credit speculation.

Key words: prospect theory, online review, cash back for favorable comment, value perception, evolutionary game

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