考虑消费者低碳偏好的供应链减排微分博弈模型研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.0884

中国管理科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (4): 126-137.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.0884

考虑消费者低碳偏好的供应链减排微分博弈模型研究

武丹, 杨玉香

中国计量大学经济与管理学院, 浙江杭州 310018

收稿日期:2018-06-22 修回日期:2019-02-02 发布日期:2021-04-25
通讯作者: 杨玉香(1979-),女(汉族),吉林松原人,中国计量大学经济与管理学院,教授,博士,硕士生导师,研究方向:供应链管理与决策优化,E-mail:yyx_bj2005@126.com. E-mail:yyx_bj2005@126.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金面上项目（71972172）；国家自然科学基金青年项目（71801199）；教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目（19YJA630101）；浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题（20NDJC114YB）；浙江省属高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目（2019YW04）

Study on the Differential Game Model for Supply Chain with Consumers' Low Carbon Preference

WU Dan, YANG Yu-xiang

China Jiliang University, College of Economics and Management, Hangzhou 310018, China

Received:2018-06-22 Revised:2019-02-02 Published:2021-04-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对由一个供应商和一个制造商构成的两级供应链，考虑消费者的低碳偏好和碳交易政策，建立分散决策和集中决策两种情形下的微分博弈模型解决供应链动态优化问题，比较两种情形下的最优均衡反馈策略、减排量的最优轨迹及最优利润，提出减排策略。通过数值仿真，进一步验证了命题的有效性；通过对消费者低碳偏好及碳交易价格进行灵敏度分析发现：随着低碳偏好的增加，供应商和制造商的减排量和供应链系统的利润均增加，并且政府在规划期内应及时调整碳交易政策，达到激励企业减排的效果。

关键词: 低碳偏好, 碳交易政策, 供应链协调, 微分博弈

Abstract: Carbon emission abatement behavior of each firm is long term and current decisions can affect the future status. Hence, in this paper, a supply chain including one supplier and one manufacturer is studied and the differential game model under two cases including decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making is established to study the dynamic optimization problem. In this model, consumers' low-carbon preference and carbon trading policy are considered. The optimal equilibrium feedback strategy, the optimal trajectory of emission reduction and the optimal profit of supply chain system of the two scenarios are compared and carbon emission abatement strategies are proposed. It is found the supplier's emission reduction, manufacturer's emission reduction, and supply chain system profit in the centralized decision-making are higher than the corresponding values in the decentralized decision-making, achieving supply chain coordination under the certain condition. The validity of the proposition is further verified by numerical simulation. Through the sensitivity analysis of low carbon preference and carbon trading price, it is found that with the increase of low carbon preference, the emission reduction of supplier, the emission reduction of manufacturer and the profit of supply chain system increase, and the government should adjust the carbon trading policy in time in the planning period to achieve the effect of encouraging the enterprises to reduce the emission.

Key words: low carbon preference, carbon trading policy, supply chain coordination, differential game

中图分类号:

C931

武丹, 杨玉香. 考虑消费者低碳偏好的供应链减排微分博弈模型研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(4): 126-137.

WU Dan, YANG Yu-xiang. Study on the Differential Game Model for Supply Chain with Consumers' Low Carbon Preference[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(4): 126-137.

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考虑消费者低碳偏好的供应链减排微分博弈模型研究

Study on the Differential Game Model for Supply Chain with Consumers' Low Carbon Preference

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