损失规避和资金约束下考虑促销的供应链协调

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0513

中国管理科学 ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (7): 183-193.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0513

损失规避和资金约束下考虑促销的供应链协调

代建生¹, 李玲²

1.燕山大学经济管理学院，河北秦皇岛066004；2.昆明理工大学管理与经济学院，云南昆明650093

收稿日期:2021-03-16 修回日期:2021-08-22 出版日期:2023-07-17 发布日期:2023-07-17
通讯作者: 代建生(1978-)，男（汉族），四川华蓥人，燕山大学经济管理学院，教授，博士，研究方向：供应链金融，Email:jiansheng.dai@163.com. E-mail:jiansheng.dai@163.com
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71762021)；河北省自然科学基金资助项目(G2022203005)；河北省软科学研究专项(205576103D)；河北省教育厅人文社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(ZD201904)

Coordination of a Loss Averse and Financially Constrained Supply Chain with Promotional Effort

DAI Jian-sheng¹, LI Ling²

1.School of Economics and Management, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004, China; 2.Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650093, China

Received:2021-03-16 Revised:2021-08-22 Online:2023-07-17 Published:2023-07-17
Contact: 代建生 E-mail:jiansheng.dai@163.com

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 商业信用不能解决促销资金短缺问题。在零售商不能获得银行贷款的背景下，本文考虑供应链的契约协调问题，其中零售商具有损失规避偏好、面临资金短缺、并实施促销努力，供需双方采用商业信用、促销成本分担和收益共享契约来协调供应链。在前景理论框架下，本文构建了基于预期的损失规避效用模型，刻画了不同初始资金状况下零售商的订购和促销策略，设计了三类协调契约，并探讨了损失规避偏好、初始资金状况和融资利率对运营策略及协调契约的影响。研究表明：①给定收益共享比例，损失规避度越高，批发价格就应设定得越低，而促销成本分担比例应设定得越高。②零售商的初始资金越小，能协调供应链的契约种类反而越多；但无论初始资金状况如何，总存在契约机制可以协调供应链。③初始资金不影响契约参数的关系，但影响协调契约的可行域；损失规避对协调契约的可行域以及参数之间的函数关系都有重要影响；利率在零售商使用延迟支付政策下影响契约参数设计，利率越大，批发价格越高。

关键词: 供应链协调；损失规避；资金约束；促销

Abstract: It discusses coordination of a supply chain constituted by a loss neutral supplier and a loss averse retailer, where the retailer is faced with shortage of funds and implements promotion efforts, on the assumption that the retailer cannot get access to bank financing. Based on the framework of prospect theory, an expectation-based loss aversion utility model is constructed, upon which the retailer’s ordering and promotion strategies are characterized under different initial fund statuses. What’s more, three sorts of coordination contracts are designed.

Key words: supply chain coordination; loss aversion; financial constraints; promotion

中图分类号:

C931
F274

代建生, 李玲. 损失规避和资金约束下考虑促销的供应链协调[J]. 中国管理科学, 2023, 31(7): 183-193.

DAI Jian-sheng, LI Ling. Coordination of a Loss Averse and Financially Constrained Supply Chain with Promotional Effort[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(7): 183-193.

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损失规避和资金约束下考虑促销的供应链协调

Coordination of a Loss Averse and Financially Constrained Supply Chain with Promotional Effort

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